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THE ALL EVENTS TESTS IN AN
ERA OF SELF-REGULATION
GLENN WALBERG*
ABSTRACT
Accrual-method taxpayers must use the all events tests to
account for rights and liabilities under contracts for sales of goods
and services. These longstanding tests evolved from transactions
that involved relatively straightforward exchanges of goods or services for payments, and the tests currently reflect an expectation
that a taxpayer will usually make an accrual when a seller’s performance fixes the contracting parties’ respective right to and liability for payment. Business practices have changed such that many
sales now occur in relationships where contracting parties assume,
monitor, and enforce process-related obligations, including adoptions of codes of conduct by members of global supply chains. This
Article explains how these efforts to self-regulate transactions complicate applications of the all events tests because the expectations
of performance and consequences of noncompliance for credence
attributes of goods or services have uncertain effects on the “fixed”
nature of payment obligations. In order to avoid these complications, the Article proposes that the all events tests should recognize
an implied requirement of acceptance. Under this proposal, a buyer’s
acceptance of goods or services, rather than the seller’s performance,
would establish a fixed payment obligation and respect the parties’
efforts to regulate aspects of the sale transaction beyond the mere
conveyance of the goods or services.
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INTRODUCTION
For decades, accrual-method taxpayers have accounted for
sales of goods and services based primarily on their rights to receive payments or liabilities to make payments under contracts.1
They have relied on tax accounting rules—known as the all events
tests—that evolved from the application of accrual methods to
discrete transactions, which often called for straightforward exchanges of goods or services for payments.2 With greater frequency,
these transactions now occur in complicated relationships with
aspects of private regulation.3 Because private regulation ordinarily
creates obligations to do more than simply tender goods or services
in exchange for payment, it becomes challenging to respect the complicated arrangements with meaningful applications of the all
events tests.4
Private regulation takes many forms. It generally involves
the establishment, monitoring, and/or enforcement of standards by
private, non-government actors.5 Private regulation might emerge
to address social, environmental, or other concerns when governments have failed to act, private parties wish to forestall government regulation, or companies react to market pressures.6
For example, trade associations and nongovernmental organizations
set many technical standards, promoting uniformity and interchangeability, and regulatory standards, which address social and
environmental externalities, for market participants that exceed
the requirements of local law.7 By its private nature, this type of
governance allows organizations to develop and implement their
See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, PUB. NO. 538,
CAT. NO. 15068G, ACCOUNTING PERIODS AND METHODS 10–12 (2019), https://
www.irs.gov/pub/irs-prior/p538--2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8BWE-UXBY].
2 See infra Part I.
3 See infra Part I.
4 See infra Part I.
5 See Lesley K. McAllister, Harnessing Private Regulation, 3 MICH. J. ENV’T.
& ADMIN. L. 291, 298–300 (2014).
6 See id. at 293–94; Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Implications of Private
Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. ONLINE 117, 121 (2014)
[hereinafter Implications].
7 See McAllister, supra note 5, at 301–06 (noting how codes establishing
responsible business practices exist for almost every industry and commodity
in the global marketplace).
1
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own regulatory standards; however, these organizations lack the
coercive power of government to enforce compliance with them.8
Considerable private regulation occurs through selfregulation.9 Individual firms often take steps, such as adopting
codes of conduct, to regulate themselves and their suppliers.10 This
self-regulation helps establish important performance expectations of suppliers that frequently exceed the requirements under
public laws.11 For instance, contracts often become vehicles for
bringing labor, safety, environmental, and other regulatory regimes
into transactions between individual firms and among members
of global supply chains.12 Whereas contracts have traditionally
focused on exchanges of products and services, regulatory provisions within contracts now address additional concerns about
related processes.13 Thus, contracts regulate how parties will fulfill
their promises.14 For example, a company might engage a service
provider to analyze the company’s customer data, and their agreement could require the service provider to abide by the company’s
data security policy.15 The agreement fundamentally involves a
sale of services, but it also seeks to regulate the service provider’s
business practices.16
Self-regulation also includes efforts to monitor and enforce
compliance with the regulatory provisions in supplier contracts.17
Parties face “incentives to cheat” because compliance can increase
operating costs, firms can often easily hide violations, and market demands for changes in conduct might dissipate with the mere
adoption of regulatory standards.18 Therefore, if they really intend
to abide by regulatory standards, parties might undertake their
See Implications, supra note 6, at 122.
See McAllister, supra note 5, at 301.
10 See id. at 306–07.
11 See id. at 307; Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 156 (2013) [hereinafter Private Environmental
Governance].
12 See Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Regulatory Functions of Transnational Commercial Contracts: New Architectures, 36 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1557, 1563–66 (2013).
13 See id. at 1558–59.
14 See, e.g., id.; William McGeveran, The Duty of Data Security, 103 MINN.
L. REV. 1135, 1170 (2019).
15 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1170.
16 See id.
17 McAllister, supra note 5, at 313.
18 Id. at 313–14.
8
9
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own efforts to assess compliance through monitoring and to correct deviations through enforcement.19 Self-regulated enforcement
might also make use of arbitration procedures to circumvent local
courts and local law by resolving disputes through the selection
of procedural and substantive rules of the parties’ choice.20 In
order to monitor and enforce compliance, the service agreement
above might require periodic third-party audits to assure the
service provider’s compliance with the data security policy, and
the parties might establish procedures to address potential security weaknesses.21
Self-regulation often occurs in the context of long-term
business relationships, including among established participants
in global supply chains.22 Long-term relationships can affect how
parties express their expectations in contracts and how closely
they follow their contracts in practice.23 For instance, regulatory
provisions might express expectations in broad standards rather
than precise rules or terms in order to accommodate unknown
future events.24 For example, the data security policy above might
expect reasonable precautions against potential risks, which
provides some flexibility in safeguarding information.25 The enforcement of performance expectations might then happen off
19 See id. at 307–16; Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at
137 (“Much of the enforcement of public and private environmental standards
in some countries arises through private inspectors enforcing private certification standards or supply chain contract requirements.”).
20 See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes
of Vendor Conduct in Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMP.
L. 711, 714 (2009) (noting how international arbitration “show[s] a tendency
toward westernization” rather than neutrality for global transactors).
21 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1187–88.
22 See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 157–58; see also
David Frydlinger et al., A New Approach to Contracts, HARVARD BUS. R. (Sept.–
Oct. 2019), https://hbr.org/2019/09/a-new-approach-to-contracts [https://perma
.cc/AMY9-PQG4].
23 See Gillian K. Hadfield & Iva Bozovic, Scaffolding: Using Formal Contracts to Support Informal Relations in Support of Innovation, 2016 WIS. L.
REV. 981, 992–94.
24 See id. (discussing how “businesses looked to industry and relational
norms to adapt to contingencies and respond to the behavior of their contracting partners” instead of specific contract language); Ronald J. Gilson et al.,
Braiding: The Interaction of Formal and Informal Contracting in Theory,
Practice, and Doctrine, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1377, 1390–91 (2010).
25 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1176–79.
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contract in order to preserve relationships—particularly in light
of high costs of switching trading partners—which makes parties
less likely to pursue formal damage claims when problems arise.26
Contracting parties might recognize that the prospect of informal
sanctions—like a decision to take future business elsewhere or
the reputational harm caused by a disclosure of nonconforming
performance—can encourage compliance and promote cooperative problem solving in established relationships.27 Thus, the
risk posed to the reputations of both the company and its service
provider from a breach of customer data28 might be enough to
compel the parties to fix an identified security issue jointly
without having to impose a contractually specified sanction,
such as contract termination, for noncompliance.29
The all events tests will approach income and expense
recognition for transactions subject to self-regulation, like other
situations, by accounting for unconditional rights and liabilities.30
As tests based on rights and liabilities, they must deal with the
broadening scope of contractual obligations from the integration
of regulatory aspects into commercial transactions and with the
formal and informal responses to deviations from those requirements.31 The tests should acknowledge that compliance with
process standards has become an integral part of contractual arrangements whereas the means for achieving any such compliance had previously been externally driven through tort claims
by injured parties and administrative actions by governments.32
See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 992, 994 (explaining how businesses, in non-innovative environments, “routinely faced unplanned-for contingencies and the problem of relational adaptation”; however, “rather than
resorting to contractual terms ... these businesses said they made little use of formal contracting, rarely referred to formal contracts in dispute management, and
they almost never litigated, or threatened to litigate, to enforce obligations.”).
27 See Gilson et al., supra note 24, at 1392–94; McAllister, supra note 5, at
314; Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 137 (describing how
enforcement of private environmental standards “occurs through shaming,
boycotts, private inspections, contract terminations or non-renewals, and
preferential purchasing”).
28 See McGeveran, supra note 14, at 1152–53.
29 See id. at 1158–59.
30 See infra Part I.
31 See infra Part I.
32 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1597; Fabrizio Cafaggi, The Many Features
of Transnational Private Rule-Making: Unexplored Relationships Between Custom,
26
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These regulatory provisions are now commonplace and changing
business practices33 as they impose wide-ranging obligations, such
as requiring suppliers to curb deforestation,34 provide their employees with paid family leave and paid sick and vacation time,35
or track sources of goods or materials with blockchain.36 The all
events tests must also accommodate noncompliance and any responses to it. Suppliers do not always comply with regulatory provisions, even if audited as part of certification programs, as they
employ child labor and strip forests, for example, in violation of
their commitments.37
This Article considers the application of the all events
tests to self-regulated transactions that incorporate regulatory
provisions in contracts for the sale of goods or services.38 Part I
exposes problems in applying the all events tests in the context
of self-regulation.39 These problems originate from unresolved
Jura Mercatorum and Global Private Regulation, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 875,
891 (2015) (“This change is driven by the need for effective regulation across
national jurisdictional boundaries when chain leaders outsource activities to
suppliers located in different jurisdictions. Private standards are addressed
to the [multinational corporation] and its whole supply chain linked via contracts.”); Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 136 (“Many
corporations have adopted environmental management systems not because
of government requirements but because their supply contracts require them
to comply with a private standard.”).
33 See Implications, supra note 6, at 128 (noting how “supply chain contracting requirements are so widespread and influential that” the policies of
large multinational corporations “are becoming the de facto regulatory floor
for the use of many toxic chemicals”).
34 See Justin Gillis, Companies Take Baton on Global Warming, INT’L N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/24/business/energy
-environment/passing-the-baton-in-climate-change-efforts.html [https://perma.cc
/KVP9-DB2T].
35 See Lauren Weber, Microsoft Presses Vendors on Leave, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 31, 2018, at B3.
36 See Michael Corkery & Nathaniel Popper, From Farm to Blockchain:
Walmart Tracks Its Lettuce, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 24, 2018), https://www.nytimes
.com/2018/09/24/business/walmart-blockchain-lettuce.html [https://perma.cc
/YAS2-66FQ].
37 See Peter Whoriskey, Chocolate Companies Sell ‘Certified Cocoa.’ But
Some of Those Farms Use Child Labor, Harm Forests, WASH. POST (Oct. 23, 2019),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/2019/10/23/chocolate-companies-say
-their-cocoa-is-certified-some-farms-use-child-labor-thousands-are-protected
-forests/ [https://perma.cc/KVP9-DB2T].
38 See infra Part I.
39 See infra Part I.
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issues under the all events tests that create uncertainty in many
contexts; however, this Part illustrates how self-regulation increases the uncertainty.40 In particular, Part I discusses how
self-regulation interacts with conditions on payment obligations,
satisfaction of performance obligations, and certainty about rights
and liabilities.41 This Part also explores how self-regulation influences knowable information and its potential effect on accruals.42
In response to these problems, Part II proposes that the all
events tests recognize an implied requirement of acceptance.43
This Part explains that, if rights and liabilities were conditioned
on acceptance, the all events tests could readily handle conforming
and nonconforming performances without ignoring the significance
of self-regulation in modern commercial transactions.44
I.THE ALL EVENTS TESTS
Two separate tests determine when a taxpayer accrues
items of income and expense for tax purposes.45 One all events
test generally requires income recognition when all events have
occurred to fix a taxpayer’s right to receive the income and its
amount is determinable with reasonable accuracy.46 Subject to
economic performance requirements,47 the other all events test
generally permits an expense deduction when all events have
See infra Part I.
See infra Part I.
42 See infra Part I.
43 See infra Part II.
44 See infra Part II.
45 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A), 1.461-1(a)(2)(i).
46 See I.R.C. § 451(b)(1)(C); Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A), 1.451-1(a). For
certain taxpayers and items of income, the all events test is treated as satisfied
no later than when a taxpayer includes income in its financial statement revenue.
See I.R.C. § 451(b)(1). This earlier-of approach still requires that the taxpayer
determine when its right becomes fixed and the amount is determinable with
reasonable accuracy in order to identify the earlier occurrence. See id.
47 See I.R.C. § 461(h). The economic performance rules generally try to
prevent a deduction before a taxpayer economically incurs a liability even if
the taxpayer faces an unconditional obligation to pay it. See STAFF OF J. COMM.
ON TAX’N, 98TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF
THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984 (Comm. Print 1984). Accordingly, the economic performance rules generally prevent the all events test from being satisfied
any earlier than when economic performance occurs. See I.R.C. § 461(h)(1).
40
41
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occurred to fix the taxpayer’s liability to pay the expense and its
amount is determinable with reasonable accuracy.48 Each of these
two-part tests thus includes a fixed prong and an amount prong.49
A taxpayer must satisfy both prongs before satisfying a test and
accruing an item.50
The all events tests would naturally apply to the sale of
goods or services in arrangements where contracting parties choose
to self-regulate their activities. In fact, the same events would
presumably satisfy the fixed prong of each test such that a buyer’s
unconditional obligation to pay for goods or services should correspond to the seller’s unconditional right to receive such payment.51 Although issues undoubtedly arise in applying the all
events tests to any situation, the efforts of contracting parties to
self-regulate amplify the challenges of determining when rights
and liabilities become fixed and for holding the parties responsible for making that determination.52
A. The Absolute Standard for Fixed Rights and Liabilities
The fixed prongs of the all events tests contemplate that
taxpayers will only take into account unconditional rights to income and unconditional liabilities to pay.53 The tests ostensibly
impose an absolute standard that rejects accruals based on likely,
probable, or expected outcomes.54 The unconditional standard of
48 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A), 1.461-1(a)(2)(i). The all events test
determines when a taxpayer may take a liability into account, and the taxpayer
might account for the liability as an expense or capital expenditure. See Treas.
Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(B). Accordingly, a taxpayer might take into account and
capitalize the cost of acquired inventory. See id. To improve readability, the following discussions about timing will generically reference deducting an item as
an expense even though a taxpayer might account for the liability differently.
49 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A), 1.461-1(a)(2)(i).
50 See id.
51 See Rev. Rul. 98-39, 1998-2 C.B. 198, 199.
52 See infra Section I.A.
53 See United States v. Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 600–01 (1986).
54 See id.
Thus, to satisfy the all-events test, a liability must be “final and
definite in amount,” Security Flour Mills Co. v. Commissioner,
321 U.S. 281, 287 (1944), must be “fixed and absolute,” Brown v.
Helvering, 291 U.S., at 201, and must be “unconditional,” Lucas v.
North Texas Lumber Co., 281 U.S. 11, 13 (1930). And one may say
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the tests had originated when many trading arrangements were
more straightforward than the complex contractual and business
relationships seen today, such as those in modern global supply
chains.55 As a result, the standard’s application has become less
certain and less workable as taxpayers operate in increasingly
complex environments.56
1. Conditional Payment Obligations
Conditions might affect whether a taxpayer has a fixed
right or liability for purposes of the all events tests. A condition
precedent represents an uncertain event that must occur before
a right or liability can become fixed.57 Conditions precedent might
include a third party’s approval of a sale or a creditor’s submission
of a claim form.58 In contrast, a condition subsequent is an uncertain event that, upon its occurrence, extinguishes a previously
fixed right or liability.59 Thus, a return of goods by a customer
that “the tax law requires that a deduction be deferred until ‘all
the events’ have occurred that will make it fixed and certain.”
Thor Power Tool Co. v. Commissioner, 439 U.S. 522, 543 (1979).
Id.
Cf. Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal Structure, 113 NW. U. L.
REV. 279, 283 (2018) (“[M]odern contracts are fundamentally different from
the relatively simple contracts that motivated classic questions. A growing body
of empirical scholarship has noted that modern contracts have grown substantially in complexity. They are longer, tackle more difficult issues, and are
harder to read and understand.” (footnotes omitted)); Franklin G. Snyder &
Ann M. Mirabito, The Death of Contracts, 52 DUQ. L. REV. 345, 376–81 (2014)
(describing contract law as better suited for the 1850–1950 period, rather
than modern times, because it presupposes resolving conflicts only through
court systems, often with lay juries, and using rules and principles designed for
irregular and informal contracting processes where “[p]arties routinely enter into
agreements in careless, sloppy, and idiosyncratic ways, so that it is frequently
difficult to tell if they have made a contract and, if so, what it requires”).
56 See Glenn Walberg, Just Enough: Substantial Performance, Ministerial
Acts and the All Events Tests for Income and Expense Accruals, 10 FLA. TAX
REV. 459, 460 (2010) [hereinafter Just Enough].
57 See Charles Schwab Corp. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 282, 293 (1996) (income
accrual), aff’d, 161 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1998); Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. United
States, 782 F.3d 1354, 1364–65 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (expense accrual).
58 See Rosenthal v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 225, 229 (1959) (third-party approval);
United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 244–45 (1987) (claim
form submissions).
59 See Charles Schwab, 107 T.C. at 293 (“conditions subsequent ... will terminate an existing right to income, but the presence of which does not preclude
55
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might represent a condition subsequent that would eliminate an
existing right to income that arose from the sale of those goods
to the customer.60 The all events tests generally defer recognition for a right or liability until the satisfaction of a condition
precedent because the final event must have occurred to fix the
right or liability.61 The tests then expect a taxpayer to account
for the occurrence of any condition subsequent as a separate
transaction that causes the loss of a fixed right or release of a
fixed liability.62
The all events tests generally rely on a conceptual distinction between conditions precedent and conditions subsequent,
and the satisfaction of either type of condition seemingly depends on the occurrence of isolated events.63 The tests are best
suited for a single agreement that clearly identifies the effect of
a condition on a payment obligation where an identifiable event
either establishes a right or liability (e.g., a third-party approval)
or extinguishes a right or liability (e.g., a product return).64 But
taxpayers usually must apply the tests under less straightforward
accrual of income”); Cooper Cmtys., Inc. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 1408,
1412 (W.D. Ark. 1987) (“This liability, however, is subject to being cut off by
the default of the purchaser .... This type of ‘condition’ or ‘contingency’ could
more appropriately be termed a condition subsequent acting to divest or terminate payments.”).
60 See Newhouse Broad. Corp. v. Comm’r, 80 T.C.M. (CCH) 178 (2000).
61 See Burnham Corp. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 953, 956 (1988), aff’d, 878 F.2d
86 (2d Cir. 1989).
If existence of a liability depends on satisfaction of a condition
precedent, the liability is not unconditionally fixed as required
by the first requirement of the all events test. Liability does
not in fact arise until the condition is satisfied. A taxpayer is,
therefore, prevented from obtaining the benefit of a deduction
for an expense that he has no liability to pay until some event,
other than the passage of time, occurs. A liability subject to a
condition subsequent, however, is definitely fixed, subject only to
a condition which may cut off liability in the future. An accrual
basis taxpayer having such a liability may deduct an expense
for which it is presently liable.
Id. (emphasis in original).
62 See United States v. Hughes Props., Inc., 476 U.S. 593, 606 (1986); J.J.
Little & Ives Co. v. Comm’r, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 372, 392–93 (1966).
63 See Charles Schwab, 107 T.C. at 293.
64 See Rosenthal v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 225, 228–29 (1959); see also Charles
Schwab, 107 T.C. at 293–94.
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circumstances, especially if they layer self-regulation onto their
relationships.65
To the extent self-regulation imposes conditions on payment obligations,66 those conditions might not fit neatly within
the condition precedent or condition subsequent schemes.67 Unlike a clear triggering event that creates or extinguishes a right
or liability, a regulatory provision describes expectations about
the manner of performance and often lacks an explicit connection
to a payment obligation.68 Payment obligations usually arise under contracts when parties perform as promised, and contracts
often do not address the consequences of nonperformance.69 But
the connection between a regulatory provision and payment obligation becomes most apparent in the event of noncompliance.70
For example, consider a regulatory provision that prohibits a
seller of goods from using child labor.71 A contract would likely
state the prohibition and the buyer’s obligation to pay for goods
without revealing a connection between the prohibition and obligation even though the obligation to pay presumably depends,
65 Cf. Snyder & Mirabito, supra note 55, at 387 (describing modern commerce as differing from the “one-shot, quasi-commercial relationships” of the
past, from which contract law developed, where “individuals haggled with shop
owners over prices and terms of sale, with idiosyncratic terms relating to
payment, warranties, rights of return, and so on”).
66 See id. at 372 (“When and how a term in a contract becomes a condition
is matter of subtle reasoning ....”).
67 See Charles Schwab, 107 T.C. at 293.
68 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1568–69.
69 See ZACHARY WOLFE, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 7-184 (4th ed.
2019).
The law ... requir[es] that the parties express their expectations
as to performance with considerable definiteness .... But the
law does not require the parties to state what their expectations
are in the event of breach and other remote contingencies,
and such matters are often omitted from the agreement.
Id.
70 See, e.g., Omri Ben-Shahar & James J. White, Boilerplate and Economic
Power in Auto Manufacturing Contracts, 104 MICH. L. REV. 953, 965 n.42
(2006) (describing how General Motor’s general terms and conditions require
suppliers “to refrain from engaging in ‘corrupt business practices’ such as using child and prisoner labor.” (citation omitted)).
71 Id.
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as a condition precedent or condition subsequent, on the type of
labor used.72
The conditional nature of a payment obligation, for tax
purposes, might depend on whether a regulatory provision functions as an express warranty or a performance obligation.73 For
example, the seller above could commit to the labor standard
with respect to the sale of goods as an express warranty about
the quality of the goods.74 Goods carrying a warranty of being
child labor free have a quality that can competitively distinguish
them from other goods in the marketplace.75 The seller could
breach that express warranty only if the buyer first accepts the
goods,76 and the buyer’s acceptance would establish its obligation
to pay the agreed upon contract price for the goods.77 The buyer
could then offset the contract price or seek repayment for damages resulting from the breach of warranty.78 Therefore, a regulatory provision functioning as an express warranty looks like a
condition subsequent for tax purposes because a failure to comply reduces or extinguishes the payment obligation established
by acceptance.79 Acceptance fixes the payment obligation irrespective of the seller’s compliance with the regulatory provision;
the sale is completed albeit with goods of an inferior quality.80
In contrast, compliance with a regulatory provision might
become necessary to fix a payment obligation. As a performance
obligation, the seller would commit to delivering goods that conform
to the regulatory standard.81 Goods manufactured with child labor
See Burnham Corp. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C., 956 (1988), aff’d, 878 F.2d 86
(2d Cir. 1989).
73 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1586–88 (describing how regulatory provisions can function as express warranties as opposed to performance obligations).
74 See U.C.C. § 2-313(1)(a) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (describing
how “[a]ny affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer which
relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an
express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise.”).
75 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1586–87.
76 See U.C.C. § 2-714(1); id. § 2-714 cmt. 1; Timothy Davis, UCC Breach of
Warranty and Contract Claims: Clarifying the Distinction, 61 BAYLOR L. REV.
783, 789–91 (2009).
77 See U.C.C. § 2-607(1).
78 See U.C.C. § 2-717.
79 See Davis, supra note 76, at 789–90.
80 See id.
81 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1586.
72
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differ from goods manufactured without child labor, and the seller
could not substitute one for the other in fulfilling its promise.82
A delivery of unaccepted, nonconforming goods would thus create a breach of contract claim.83 Because the seller’s tendering of
nonconforming goods would not fulfill its promised performance,
the seller could not hold the buyer to its promises in the contract,
and the buyer would have no obligation to pay for the goods.84 For
tax purposes, a regulatory provision functioning as a performance
obligation looks like a condition precedent if the seller must deliver conforming goods in order to fix the payment obligation.85
Therefore, very different tax consequences might arise depending on whether the buyer accepts or rejects goods86 and whether
the contract establishes a regulatory provision as a warranty or
performance obligation.87 Unfortunately, the contract would likely
state the prohibition without clarifying its status as an express
warranty or performance obligation given that contracts frequently incorporate a variety of regulatory standards, such as a
corporate code of conduct, by reference.88
Self-regulation also creates ongoing process-related expectations for contracting parties that differ from the isolated events
often associated with conditions under the all events tests.89 Parties
Cf. Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of
Modularity and the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1229–30
(2006) (noting the collapse of any distinction between a physical product and a
contract governing its exchange insofar as, from an economic perspective, the contract terms become part of “a unified set of disparate features” of the product).
83 See U.C.C. § 2-711(1); id. § 2-711 cmt. 1 (“The remedies listed here are
those available to a buyer who has not accepted the goods or who has justifiably revoked his acceptance. The remedies available to a buyer with regard to
goods finally accepted appear in [U.C.C. § 2-714] dealing with breach in regard
to accepted goods.”).
84 See id. § 2-711(1); id. § 2-607 cmt. 1; Davis, supra note 76, at 792–94.
85 See Davis, supra note 76, at 794–96.
86 See id.
87 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1585–86.
88 See id.; see generally U.C.C. § 2-313(2) (“It is not necessary to the creation of an express warranty that the seller use formal words such as ‘warrant’
or ‘guarantee’ or that he have a specific intention to make a warranty ....”).
89 See Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and
Network Governance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561,
566–68 (2015) [hereinafter Beyond Relational Contracts].
82
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might enter into a legally unenforceable long-term supply agreement, for example, to establish an overall framework for a relationship and then create enforceable obligations by executing
purchase orders for smaller transactions within that relationship.90
A buyer’s willingness to continue a long-term relationship generally
depends on its overall satisfaction with the supplier’s performance
rather than the supplier’s fulfillment of its legal obligations under a specific purchase order.91 If a long-term supply agreement
prohibits any use of child labor at the supplier’s facilities even in
fulfilling orders from the supplier’s other customers, then the buyer
would likely expect ongoing compliance by the supplier.92 But
the all events tests might look for a connection between compliance
and the payment obligation under a specific purchase order.
Whether a condition might depend on compliance before, during,
or after performance remains unclear because the purchase order is just part of a complex, long-term relationship.93
A long-term relationship could further complicate any
conditional relationship between a compliance expectation and a
payment obligation.94 Because a claim of breach often ends a trading relationship, a buyer is less likely to assert a right to monetary damages from a long-term supplier than from a seller in a
one-off transaction.95 Generally, in long-term relationships, a
preferred strategy might leave some portion of nonconforming
performances unpunished due to the potential for mistakes in
attributing deviations to opportunistic behavior and the likelihood of retaliation for imposing undeserved sanctions.96 More
specifically, when regulatory expectations are not met, a buyer
is often more concerned about correcting the process than imposing a penalty for noncompliance.97 As a result, what ostensibly
See id.
See id. at 567.
92 See id. at 566.
93 See id.
94 See id. at 570.
95 See id.
96 See Gilson et al., supra note 24, at 1395.
97 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1611 (“[T]he main objective of remedies
[for regulatory noncompliance] is to restore compliance rather than to provide
compensation. Cooperative remedies for regulatory non-compliance may therefore
also affect the resolution of strictly commercial disputes.” (footnote omitted));
90
91
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looks like a condition on payment in a contract might actually
operate as a condition for continued participation in an overall
trading relationship.98 So contracting parties might not allow
events, which could otherwise affect entitlements to payments,
to actually change payment obligations because the parties prefer to use regulatory provisions to shape and reinforce desirable
outcomes in long-term relationships.99
2. Performance Under a Contract
Performance plays an outsized role in the administration
of the all events tests.100 A party’s performance under a contract
often serves as the event that arguably fixes a right or liability.101 For instance, the Internal Revenue Service (Service)—
with some acceptance by the courts102—characterizes a right to
income as fixed upon the earliest of when required performance
occurs, payment becomes due, or payment is made.103 Similarly,
the Service regards a liability as fixed upon the earliest of when
an event, such as required performance, occurs to fix the liability
or when payment becomes due.104 Consequently, for purposes of
Lin, supra note 20, at 726 (“Implementation of vendor codes ... does not only
have a remedial dimension but a preventative one.”); see also Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583–84.
The reason for a breach influences [an original equipment manufacturer’s] response. Breaches due to one-off manufacturing
glitches are largely ignored, unless they are frequent. Breaches
due to systematic production problems (even large ones) that
the buyer thinks can be remedied are initially met with offers
of technical assistance, sometimes at the buyer’s expense. And
opportunistic breaches or breaches caused by operational difficulties that cannot be remedied are typically met with the
harshest responses, including termination for cause.
Id. (footnote omitted).
98 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 584.
99 See id.
100 See Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 149, 150; Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1
C.B. 350, 351.
101 See Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 150; Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 C.B. 351.
102 See, e.g., Charles Schwab Corp. v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. 282, 292 (1996)
(“The taxpayer’s right to receive income is fixed upon the earliest of (1) the
taxpayer’s receipt of payment, (2) the contractual due date, or (3) the taxpayer’s performance.”), aff’d, 161 F.3d 1231 (9th Cir. 1998).
103 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 150.
104 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 C.B. 351.
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the all events tests, the performance of contractual obligations
fixes many rights to income and liabilities to pay.105 So taxpayers
should presumably anticipate a straightforward application of the
all events tests that often fixates on when parties have performed.
Unfortunately, existing authorities and guidance provide
little indication about what constitutes performance for purposes of the all events tests.106 In particular, they do not clarify
when “close enough” to contractual promises is sufficient for performance to occur under the tests.107 This lack of clarity becomes
significant for agreements with regulatory provisions because
they often task contracting parties with additional responsibilities or subject them to certain limitations, which might redefine
performance expectations.108 For example, as part of a buyer’s
initiative to become carbon neutral, a regulatory provision might
require its supplier to manufacture goods using only electricity
from renewable sources.109 Whether and how this requirement
might affect the supplier’s performance (and correspondingly,
the satisfaction of the all events tests for the buyer and supplier)
remains unclear.
A seller can tender goods or services as generally described in
a contract without fulfilling all process-related requirements.110
For example, the supplier above could deliver goods that meet
their required physical specifications, even if the supplier used
electricity from nonrenewable sources.111 Whether the supplier
has a fixed right to income, and the buyer has a fixed liability to
See Schneer v. Comm’r, 97 T.C. 643, 650 (1991) (“[T]he prerequisite of
performance of the services prior to any liability on the part of the obligor is
an essential to satisfying the all-events test. The right to receive income cannot become fixed before the obligor has an obligation to pay.”).
106 See Snyder & Mirabito, supra note 55, at 390–92.
107 See id. at 391–92 (noting how an assumption that parties are satisfied
with “close enough” under the substantial performance doctrine of contract
law does not fit with “demands [for] absolute, strict adherence to standards”
in modern lean production systems and supply chains).
108 See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 156–58.
109 See id. at 156–57 (explaining Wal-Mart’s energy efficiency requirements
for its suppliers); Verónica H. Villena & Dennis A. Gioia, A More Sustainable
Supply Chain, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.–Apr. 2020, https://hbr.org/2020/03/a-more
-sustainable-supply-chain [https://perma.cc/2HEY-NWTK].
110 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 460, 470.
111 See, e.g., Villena & Gioia, supra note 109 (confirming that many companies may meet cost, quality, and delivery goals, but not social or environmental standards).
105
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pay might depend on whether the delivery of those nonconforming goods constitutes performance under the all events tests.112
The all events tests never specify whether the focus on required performance means the parties must satisfy all contractual
obligations in order to fix their respective rights and liabilities.113
Theoretically, the tests could assess the occurrence of required
performance in a manner akin to either the exactness of the perfect tender rule of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC),114 the
reasonableness of the substantial performance and material breach
doctrines of the common law,115 or the tolerance of a more forgiving
With respect to the liability to pay, the economic performance rules
might regard simply delivering the physical items as sufficient for economic
performance to occur. See Treas. Reg. § 1.461-4(d)(2)(i) (“[E]conomic performance
occurs as the services or property is provided.”). Those rules complement the
all events test and generally try to prevent a deduction before a taxpayer economically incurs a liability rather than identify the particular events that make
the taxpayer liable. See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N., 98TH CONG., GENERAL
EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT
OF 1984 (Comm. Print 1984). The rules could reasonably meet that objective
by postponing a deduction for an otherwise fixed future performance obligation
until services or property are provided, see H.R. REP. NO. 98-861, at 871 (1984)
(Conf. Rep.), even if certain other contractual obligations remain unfulfilled
at that later date. Consequently, the “as provided” standard of section 461(h)
suggests the economic performance rules can accept something less stringent
than the required performance expected under the all events tests. See Rev.
Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 150; Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 C.B. 350.
113 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.461-1(a)(2)(i)–(ii).
114 See Midwest Mobile Diagnostic Imaging, L.L.C. v. Dynamics Corp., 965
F. Supp. 1003, 1010–11 (W.D. Mich. 1997) aff’d, 165 F.3d 27 (6th Cir. 1998).
Under § 2-601 [of the Uniform Commercial Code], a buyer has
the right to reject, “if the goods or tender of delivery fail in any
respect to conform to the contract ....” Known as the “perfect
tender” rule, this standard requires a very high level of conformity. Under this rule, the buyer may reject a seller’s tender
for any trivial defect, whether it be in the quality of the goods,
the timing of performance, or the manner of delivery.
Id.; accord H.J. Heinz Co. v. Granger, 147 F. Supp. 664, 671 (W.D. Penn.
1956) (“[T]he principle is clear that where the parties to a contract have really
made payment dependent upon the happening of some condition, their agreement
should not be disregarded for tax purposes.”).
115 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTS. § 237 cmt. d (AM. L. INST. 1981)
(noting the similarity of asking whether a material failure of performance has
occurred or whether substantial performance has occurred); accord Levert v.
Comm’r, 57 T.C.M. (CCH) 910, 917 (1989).
112
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standard.116 Without having endorsed a specific approach, applications of the tests indicate a willingness to accept some deviations from contract terms in evaluating whether performance has
occurred.117 Consequently, unless a party asserts that a particular
deviation nullifies its liability under an agreement,118 the all events
tests might disregard some degree of noncompliance in finding
that a party performed as required.
If a party tenders goods or services but deviates from requirements imposed through self-regulation efforts, then an all
events test might justify its disregard for certain unfulfilled contractual obligations by characterizing them as ministerial, procedural, or mechanical acts (collectively ‘ministerial acts’).119 For
purposes of applying the all events tests, courts and the Service
have dismissed the nonperformance of ministerial acts in finding
fixed rights and liabilities.120 Unfortunately, their findings provide little explanation about how tests purporting to demand the
occurrence of “all events” can ignore unfulfilled contractual obligations.121 Occasionally, they instead rationalize that ministerial
[P]etitioners did not become unconditionally liable for the full
amounts of the contract prices until the contractor completed,
at least in substantial part, its duties under the contracts. Until
that time, the possibility remained that a “material failure” of
performance would excuse petitioners’ refusal to pay .... We find
that the parties contemplated significant performance by the
contractor prior to the time petitioners were required to make
full payment of the contract prices.
Id.
Accord I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 1999-1134 (undated) (describing a disagreement within the Service, in the context of claim submissions for cooperative advertising, about satisfying the all events test through the compliance
with all terms of a contract versus through the performance of the designated
services in the contract).
117 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289 (Situation 3) (finding a fixed
right to income upon the mistaken shipment of the wrong quantity of goods).
118 See Dixie Pine Prods. Co. v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 516, 519 (1944) (holding
that a taxpayer cannot claim a deduction for a “fixed and certain” liability
while simultaneously contesting the fact of its liability).
119 Just Enough, supra note 56, at 473.
120 See, e.g., Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 293, 314 (2000) (“A liability can be fixed even if there are procedural or ministerial steps that still
have to occur before payment.”), aff’d, 484 F.3d 731 (5th Cir. 2007).
121 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 473–80.
116
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acts deal with minor,122 insubstantial,123 or nonessential124 matters
that—unlike the primary125 or substantial126 actions contemplated
by agreements—cannot prevent the fixing of a right or liability even
though they remain unperformed.127 In essence, courts and the
Service often allow the events most directly related to providing
goods or services to drive income and expense recognition.128
As a result, a taxpayer might have a fixed right to receive or
liability to make payment under a contract despite the nonperformance of a ministerial act that the contract expressly designates as
a term and condition for payment.129 Thus, one might expect a ministerial act characterization for a boilerplate, compliance-with-laws
See Exxon Mobil, 114 T.C. at 319 (regarding a lease provision as “ministerial and perfunctory”); Schneider v. Comm’r, 65 T.C. 18, 28 (1975) (“only
the ministerial act of computation remained to be done”), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 2;
I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-03-079 (Oct. 8, 2008) (“[R]emaining minor or
ministerial duties ... do not delay accrual.”).
123 See I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 81-29-114 (Apr. 27, 1981) (“[m]inisterial functions
are not substantial conditions”); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 1992 WL 1354886
(Mar. 14, 1992) (“no substantive contingency remains”).
124 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 2001-04-011 (Oct. 19, 2000) (“The claim filing
itself is ministerial, that is, it is not essential to the process of fixing the liability.”); I.R.S. Field Serv. Adv. 1993 WL 1468075 (Apr. 30, 1993).
125 See Charles Baloian Co. v. Comm’r, 68 T.C. 620, 627 (1977) (distinguishing
an approval, as “simply a ministerial act,” from the “primary substantive
considerations and decisions”), nonacq., 1978-2 C.B. 3; I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul.
81-29-114 (Apr. 27, 1981) (“not substantial conditions”).
126 See Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 26, 33 (1988) (“Far from being
a ministerial act, the passage of title and risk of loss to the buyer constitutes
the very heart of the transaction and is the sine qua non to petitioner’s right
to receive payment.”); Challenge Publ’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 845 F.2d 1541, 1544
(9th Cir. 1988) (describing a non-ministerial contractual requirement as a
“legally significant moment”); Rev. Rul. 2003-3, 2003-1 C.B. 252 (noting how
the approvals of tax refunds “involves substantive review”); I.R.S. Chief Couns.
Mem. 2013-43-01F (Sept. 18, 2013) (“A ministerial act is one ‘performed without the independent exercise of discretion or judgement.’” (quoting BLACK’S
LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009))).
127 See Dally v. Comm’r, 227 F.2d 724, 727 (9th Cir. 1955).
128 See Hallmark Cards, 90 T.C. at 33; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 2013-4301F (Sept. 18, 2013).
129 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2003-10-003 (Oct. 30, 2002) (“Even if the
terms of the sales agreement made acceptance of the system a condition precedent to the right to receive income, ... [it] is merely a ministerial act, and is not
required to establish Taxpayer’s right to the income under the all-events test.”).
122
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provision, which requires contracting parties to obey local, state,
and federal laws.130 Such legal compliance might appear of minor
importance when compared to providing the goods or services specified by the contract. Accordingly, the all events tests might reasonably treat required performance as occurring when such goods
or services are provided even if a party has violated a local noise
ordinance, state zoning law, or federal tax regulation.
However, as contracting parties assume responsibility to
self-regulate their activities, it becomes more difficult to dismiss
their obligations as ministerial acts.131 Instead of broadly referencing compliance with laws, contracts frequently require compliance with specific laws, industry standards, codes of conduct,
quality manuals, and environmental handbooks.132 In particular,
procurement contracts of multinational companies often rely on
specific compliance obligations to impose international or homecountry laws and standards on members of global supply chains.133
For example, many buyers require their global suppliers to adhere
to environmental requirements, including obligations to reduce
emissions and energy usage.134 Although a buyer might only require its suppliers to comply with their respective local environmental laws, many contractual requirements exceed those of
domestic laws and adopt the standards of the buyer’s homecountry laws or of private standard setters, such as the International Organization for Standardization.135 Notably, the decision
and effort to self-regulate a specific activity or behavior suggests
See, e.g., Doshi v. Gen. Cable Corp., 386 F. Supp. 3d 815, 829 (E.D. Ky.
2019) (“The vague nature of this sentence and its borderline boilerplate quality”
states “compliance ... with federal, state and local laws.”); accord Morning
Star Packing Co. et. al, v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo 2020-142 (“The credit agreements[, with covenants to comply with all laws, do not] specify which laws or
regulations must be complied with .... Accordingly, we conclude that the generalized obligations found in the credit agreements do not establish the fact of
the partnerships’ liability [under the all events test] ....”).
131 See Implications, supra note 6, at 121, 129–30 (providing examples of
how companies are self-regulating).
132 See Lin, supra note 20, at 720–22; Beyond Relational Contracts, supra
note 89, at 567–68.
133 See Lin, supra note 20, at 715–16.
134 See Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 156–57.
135 See id. at 156.
130
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that at least one party finds the obligation important rather
than an insubstantial or nonessential ministerial act.136
As the terms and conditions of contracts move from general
to specific compliance obligations, they start aligning more closely
with basic expectations about performance.137 Multinational companies regard vendor-conduct obligations as valuable tools for
satisfying consumer demands about social and environmental aspects of goods and services and for managing costs and risks associated with the threat posed by disreputable behavior within a
global supply chain.138 Thus companies enjoy considerable benefits
from marketing items produced, for example, through sustainable
processes and prefer to avoid the considerable risks presented by
processes that employ sweatshop practices.139 Moreover, a supply
chain’s adoption of specific regulatory requirements can help differentiate its products from those of competing supply chains.140 These
benefits suggest that a taxpayer might pursue self-regulation
efforts in furtherance of its profit-seeking activities, rather than
for purely benevolent reasons.141 Thus, a specific compliance obligation might be closely tied to a “primary” activity of providing
goods or services and potentially inseparable from the performance
evaluated under the all events tests.
For example, a taxpayer’s contract for the delivery of goods
might obligate a supplier to abide by ethical standards, as specified in a code of conduct, for the treatment of its production-line
employees.142 In that situation, the all events test would need to
See id. at 173.
See, e.g., Lin, supra note 20, at 717–19 (describing codes of vendor conduct
that require certain labor standards to be upheld during production processes).
138 See id. at 717–20.
139 See id. at 718–19.
140 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1564.
141 See Implications, supra note 6, at 123–25; see also Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 147 (characterizing standard setting as private environmental guidance “so long as it induces a private entity to achieve
a traditionally governmental objective ... or to serve a traditionally governmental function” regardless of the motivation for doing so).
142 See Lin, supra note 20, at 717 (noting how code of conduct standards
for labor “generally include topics concerning child labor, forced labor, health
and safety measures in workplaces, freedom of association and right to collective bargaining, discrimination, working hours, and compensation”); id. at
720 (describing frequent references to International Labor Organization Labor
136
137
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determine whether the taxpayer could have a fixed liability to pay
if the supplier delivered goods but violated a standard during
production.143 That determination depends in part on the scope
of required performance, which might include perceptions of separate performance obligations (e.g., performance required two activities: the ethical treatment of employees and the delivery of the
goods), comprehensive performance obligations (e.g., performance
through the delivery of goods could only occur if the goods met
both physical specifications and intangible ethical-production attributes), significant relationships between obligations (e.g., nonperformance of the ethical treatment is excused as a ministerial
aspect of a primary activity rather than as a freestanding secondary activity), etc. In short, the taxpayer must confront a fundamental question about what constitutes required performance
under the all events test even though existing authorities and
guidance provides little help in evaluating how integral regulatory provisions are to performance expectations.144
Unfortunately, responses to noncompliance might indicate
that regulatory provisions have varying connections to performance.145 For example, a discovery that toxic substances were
used by a supplier in the processing of food items, where such
use was legal but violated the safety requirements established
in codes of conduct or industry standards, might lead a buyer to
demand product withdrawals or other corrective actions for delivered items.146 In that instance, the buyer’s response indicates
that regulatory compliance was integral to performance.147 On
Conventions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child in codes of vendor conduct).
143 See Rev. Rul. 2007-3, 2007-1 C.B. 350 (“[A]ll the events have occurred
that establish the fact of the liability when (1) the event fixing the liability,
whether that be the required performance or other event, occurs ....”); Villena
& Gioia, supra note 109 (describing a study that discovered many suppliers
in the networks of sustainability leaders supply chains “were violating the
standards that the MNCs expected them to adhere to”).
144 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 480 (“[T]he anomaly provides little
guidance but awkwardly forces taxpayers to decide what contractual requirements, which were important enough to include in the contract, are too insubstantial to take into account in applying the all events tests.”).
145 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1576–77.
146 See id. at 1596.
147 See id.
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the other hand, the supplier could have alternatively violated
working conditions standards, such as having employees exceed
a maximum number of working hours in a week during the processing of the items. In that event, the buyer would more likely
seek process-related changes for future production without insisting
that the supplier take corrective actions, like product withdrawals,
for the delivered items.148 The forward-looking response suggests a
weaker connection between the regulatory provision and the
performance expectations for the delivered items.149
Performance could also depend on the extent of regulatory
compliance. A contract might incorporate regulatory aspects by
requiring a supplier’s certification under standards established
by a third party.150 Some certification schemes, like those in the
field of food safety, “identify different levels of compliance by using
a metric, which correlates the choice of remedies to the seriousness of non-compliance.”151 The varying degrees of compliance
identifiable by a certifier stands in contrast to the all-or-nothing
approach that a court follows in distinguishing between a material and immaterial breach while assessing performance under a
contract.152 No guidance indicates whether the all events tests
would assess performance from a degree-of-compliance or an allor-nothing approach in identifying fixed rights and liabilities for
tax purposes.153
Finally, considerations of performance might note that contracting parties sometimes tolerate or make off-contract adjustments for deviations from regulatory obligations.154 In preserving
an ongoing relationship, a party might willingly make these adjustments on certain occasions even if the party were unwilling
to commit itself in a contract to make them.155 The all events tests
arguably might find tolerance or adjustments for noncompliance
See id. at 1596–97.
See id. at 1596–99.
150 See id. at 1601.
151 Id. at 1607.
152 See id.
153 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 460–61, 471.
154 See Lisa Bernstein, Merchant Law in a Merchant Court: Rethinking the
Code’s Search for Immanent Business Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1765, 1808
(1996) [hereinafter Merchant Law].
155 See id.
148
149
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throughout a course of dealings as an indication that nonconforming performance can establish fixed rights and liabilities for
tax purposes.156 However, it is difficult to justify how occasional
informal actions, which contradict contract terms, might establish fixed rights and liabilities for this purpose if the parties could
only seek enforcement of their actual contractual obligations.157
As taxpayers continue to self-regulate the processes employed to produce goods and provide services, the all events tests
will need to address how performance occurs under self-imposed
regulatory provisions.158 In some respects, clarification is needed
about whether, in finding fixed rights and liabilities, the tests
will treat a taxpayer’s failure to perform as promised as being
equivalent to a taxpayer’s fulfillment of its promises.159 In the
156 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 290 (questioning how a course of
dealings might affect an analysis under the all events test with respect to
defective products).
157 See Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry:
Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L.
REV. 1724, 1781 (2001) [hereinafter Cotton Industry].
There is suggestive evidence that cotton transactors may view
themselves as conducting their everyday interactions according to a set of flexible understandings that requires them to
make many adjustments, and ignore minor deviations in ways
not required by their contract’s written provisions, yet preserves their unfettered right to insist on strict performance of
their contract when they think their contracting partner is
behaving badly.
Id.; Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1800 (explaining how a party might
invoke the dispute-resolution terms in a written contract, which were intended
for a neutral third party to apply, if the parties cannot preserve their relationship by cooperatively resolving the dispute themselves).
158 See Glenn Walberg, Constructive Conditions and the All Events Test, 62
TAX LAW. 433, 438 [hereinafter Constructive Conditions] (noting the unclear
history behind the due, paid, or earned standard for a taxpayer’s fixed right
to income).
159 Cf. Snyder & Mirabito, supra note 55, at 409.
A party who wants to be paid even though it has installed the
wrong brand of product can protect itself by inserting a clause
that says "or equivalent." Parties are free to include clauses
that allow them to be paid even though there are defects. If
parties choose not to indicate when they will be happy to
agree to something less than what was bargained for, it is difficult to see why courts should bail them out ....
Id.
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meantime, taxpayers have little guidance about when performance
occurs if contracting parties voluntarily regulate their activities.
3. Virtual Certainty About Obligations
The all events tests obsess over certainty in a taxpayer’s
rights and liabilities irrespective of their legal enforceability.160
For example, in the context of deductions, the all events test distinguishes certainty about the taxpayer’s liability to pay from
certainty about whether the taxpayer will make payment.161 By
emphasizing the fact of liability, the all events test prevents a
taxpayer from claiming a deduction if doubt exists that the taxpayer will ever become liable.162 However, if liability is certain,
then the test allows a deduction despite questions about whether
the taxpayer might ever pay as a result of factors such as unenforceability.163 The all events test thus seeks to identify an obligation where the fact of liability is certain even if not supported
by a legally enforceable claim.164
This approach deals with unenforceable obligations that
arise in various contexts.165 For instance, it helps taxpayers account
See TransCalifornia Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 37 B.T.A. 119, 127 (1938) (“The
accruability test of a debt is not certainty of payment, but rather certainty of
its liability ....”), nonacq. in part, 1941-2 C.B. 24.
161 See id.
162 See Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir.
1969); S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497, 634 (1980) (“This requirement prevents the deduction of an expenditure that might never be made.”).
163 See Helvering v. Russ. Fin. & Constr. Corp., 77 F.2d 324, 327 (2d Cir.
1935) (“The existence of an absolute liability is necessary; absolute certainty
that it will be discharged by payment is not.”).
164 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252, 257 (Ct. Cl.
1976) (en banc), acq., 1996-2 C.B. 1; Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Comm’r, 30 T.C.
295, 298 (1958), nonacq., 1958-2 C.B. 9, aff’d, 266 F.2d 347 (6th Cir. 1959);
Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 143, 151 (1984), acq., 1996-2 C.B. 1.
165 See, e.g., Flamingo Resort, Inc. v. United States, 664 F.2d 1387, 1390 (9th
Cir. 1982) (finding a fixed right to receive income attributable to gambling markers that, as instruments to advance money for betting, were void under state law);
Volvo Cars of N. Am., Inc. v. United States, 80 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 6094 (M.D.N.C.
1997) vacated and remanded on other issues, 571 F.3d 373 (4th Cir. 2009).
The court acknowledges that the agreement was unenforceable
without the requisite signatures .... The court finds, however, that
whether the settlement was legally binding does not necessarily
govern whether all events necessary to establish liability had occurred in 1990 such that Volvo could claim the deduction in 1990.
160
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for income and expense items that arise from unenforceable obligations in illegal or invalid agreements.166 In that context, the
all events tests might find a fixed right or liability based upon
the occurrence of agreed upon events even though no court would
compel a party to perform as promised.167
The focus on certainty in rights and liabilities similarly
enables the tests to account for unenforceable obligations under
valid statutory provisions and lawful agreements.168 For example, the tests might recognize fixed rights or liabilities that are
legally unenforceable because they are not yet payable (i.e.,
amounts due but not payable).169 But the tests can also recognize
fixed rights and liabilities that are unenforceable because no legal obligation exists yet.170 Essentially the occurrence of certain
events might make a right or liability certain, although those events
Id.; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2002-36-007 (May 23, 2002) (noting how, “in the
absence of such executed forms, there must be some act or acts on the part of
taxpayer that clearly evidence its intent to fix its tax liability”).
166 See, e.g., Flamingo Resort, 664 F.2d at 1390; Volvo Cars, 80 A.F.T.R.2d
(RIA) 6094; I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2002-36-007.
167 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,536 (Oct. 15, 1980) (“[I]f the parties
agree that the obligation will be fixed when an event happens, the obligation will
be fixed when the event happens even though it is not legally enforceable.”).
168 See Grand Ave. Motor Co. v. United States, 124 F. Supp. 423, 425 (D.
Minn. 1954) (noting certainty of liability as the standard of the accruability
test of a debt).
169 See id. (“It is also clear that the terms ‘fixed’ and ‘determined’, as so used
are not synonymous with ‘presently payable.’”).
170 See Houchin v. Comm’r, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1248 (2006).
Assuming arguendo that delivery is required for a contract to
take effect under Colorado law and that delivery did not occur
until 1999, the above-mentioned provisions of the settlement
agreement cause the effective date of the contract to be in
1998, and therefore the all-events test was satisfied in 1998.
Id.; Mooney Aircraft, Inc. v. United States, 420 F.2d 400, 406 (5th Cir. 1969).
There is no contingency in this case as to the fact of liability
itself; the only contingency relates to when the liability will
arise. To be sure, technically, the [legal] liability is ‘created’
by the event of the retirement of a particular plane; if a plane
lasted forever there would be no liability. But taxation has
been called a ‘practical field’.... If there is any doubt whether
the liability will occur courts have been loath to interfere with
the Commissioner’s discretion is disallowing a deduction .... But
here there is no doubt at all that the liability will occur since
airplanes, like human beings, regrettably must cease to function.
Id. (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
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are not sufficient to create a legally recognized right or liability.171
Therefore, a taxpayer might account for rights and liabilities established for tax purposes before they come into legal existence.172
Accounting for unenforceable rights and liabilities presents
a challenge, particularly where they exist for tax purposes before
they arise under a contract or statute.173 Whereas legal enforceability evokes a seemingly bright-line standard, questioning the
certainty of legally unenforceable rights and liabilities invites an
ambiguous search for practical solutions.174 As explained by the
Court of Claims:
The “all events” test thus allows deductions when the taxpayer
has a special kind of knowledge which gives him enough facts
to demonstrate the absolute necessity of paying an expense at
some future date without regard to such matters as actual
payment taking place, existence of legal liability, or accrual.175

Essentially, the all events tests occasionally direct taxpayers to
account for rights and liabilities about which they are certain
but for which they have no legal entitlement or responsibility.176
Questions about taxpayer certainty have cropped up most
prominently with respect to deducting payroll taxes for earned, but
unpaid, compensation.177 An employer might become unconditionally liable to pay employees for work performed during Year 1.178
But the employer’s responsibility to remit payroll taxes might not
legally arise until the employer actually pays the employees in
Year 2.179 Given its fixed liability in Year 1 to pay the employees,
171 See Houchin, 91 T.C.M. (CCH) 1248 (finding that a settlement agreement’s date of effectiveness satisfied the all events test regardless of the legally
enforceable delivery date).
172 See id.
173 See Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252, 273 (Ct. Cl. 1976)
(en banc) (Hastie, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority for disregarding statutes and regulations when applying the case to unenforceable liabilities).
174 See id. (noting the difficulty in establishing certainty of tax liability).
175 Id. at 257.
176 See id.
177 See id. at 266 (Skelton, J., dissenting).
178 See I.R.C. § 3102(b) (“Every employer required so to deduct the tax
shall be liable for the payment of such tax ....”).
179 See, e.g., I.R.C. § 3111(a) (employer portion of FICA taxes for old age,
survivor, and disability insurance (i.e., Social Security taxes)).
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the employer might ask whether it also had a fixed liability in
Year 1 for the associated payroll taxes. In these situations, courts
and eventually the Service have applied the all events test by
ignoring the fact that the payroll taxes would only become legally
enforceable in Year 2.180 Instead, they have applied the all
events test by looking for certainty at the end of Year 1.181
The courts have found that certainty for payroll taxes depends on any wage ceiling (i.e., maximum salary base) used in
computing the taxes.182 The courts reasoned that, if an employee’s wages were to exceed the ceiling when payment occurs in
Year 2, the employer would have no payroll tax obligation and
therefore could not have had a fixed liability for the tax at the
end of Year 1.183 The courts accordingly envisioned that factors,
such as conceivable pay raises and unscheduled time off, could
affect the employer’s future obligation for payroll taxes on earned,
but unpaid, compensation.184 Consequently, for earned bonuses
and vacation pay, courts found employers too uncertain in Year 1
about whether wages would exceed the ceilings by the time they
disburse delayed bonuses or vacation pay in Year 2; therefore, the
courts held that such uncertainty prevented the associated payroll tax liabilities from being fixed in Year 1.185 In contrast, the
courts attributed a payroll tax obligation to an “automatic consequence” of having wages earned in the last days of Year 1 and
paid on the first scheduled payday of Year 2 (year-end wages).186
They found that the virtual certainty of a payroll tax obligation
on year-end wages creates a fixed, but legally unenforceable, liability for purposes of the all events test.187
See, e.g., Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 257; Rev. Rul. 96-51, 1996-2 C.B.
36, 36–37.
181 See Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 257; Rev. Rul. 96-51, 1996-2 C.B. 36,
36–37.
182 See Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 259 (noting the complicated nature of
wage ceilings as a factor of the all events test).
183 See id.
184 See id. at 260.
185 See id.; S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C. 497, 634–35 (1980).
186 Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 259–60.
187 See id. at 260; Burlington N.R.R. Co. v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 143, 148 (1984),
acq., 1996-2 C.B. 1.; Rev. Rul. 96-51, 1996-2 C.B. 36, 36–37.
180
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The willingness to accept virtual certainty, instead of demanding inevitability, presents an administrative challenge.188
Avoiding a wage ceiling is more probable for the beginning-of-year
payments of year-end wages than avoiding the ceiling for the deferred payments of some bonuses and vacation pay.189 However,
the liability for year-end wages at the end of Year 1 only creates
a logical expectation rather than an absolute obligation to pay
payroll taxes.190 Nevertheless, courts and eventually the Service
found the virtual certainty of the obligation sufficient to satisfy
the all events test for payroll taxes on year-end wages.191 Yet it
remains unclear what “special kind of knowledge” a taxpayer
must possess to determine the “absolute necessity” of satisfying
a legally unenforceable obligation for this purpose.192
The vague notion of virtual certainty continues to influence
the application of the all events test for payroll taxes.193 For example, the Service recently suggested a broader scope of virtual
certainty by alluding to employers with fixed obligations for payroll taxes attributable to earned bonuses, vacation pay, and forms
of compensation other than year-end wages.194 The Service has
188 See Eastman Kodak, 534 F.2d at 260–61 (specifying certainty as the determinative factor to the all events test).
189 See id. at 259.
190 See id. at 266–68 (Skelton, J., dissenting) (rejecting a deduction for
payroll taxes that remain contingent before the prerequisite event of paying
wages occurs).
191 See I.R.S. Field Serv. Advisory, 1994 WL 1725365 (Apr. 15, 1994) (acknowledging the concession due to litigation hazards).
192 See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38,155 (Nov. 7, 1979), clarified by Gen.
Couns. Mem. 38,536 (Oct. 15, 1980); cf. S. Pac. Transp. Co. v. Comm’r, 75 T.C.
497, 636 (1980) (“Regardless of the close relationship between the two items,
we have concluded that the contingencies and uncertainties associated with
petitioner’s estimated liability for the payroll taxes at issue are too great to
permit their deduction.”).
193 See Rev. Rul. 2007-12, 2007-1 C.B. 685, 686 (noting the troubles of applying the all events test based on past regulation); Rich Godshalk, Accelerating FICA and FUTA Tax Deductions for Vacation and Bonus Pay, 39 TAX
ADVISER 136, 136 (Mar. 2008) (“Unfortunately [§ 404] does not address the
issue of when the all-events test is satisfied with respect to payroll taxes on
deferred compensation.”).
194 See Rev. Rul. 2007-12, 2007-1 C.B. 685, 686.
If the all events test ... [is] otherwise met, an accrual basis
taxpayer may treat its payroll tax liability as incurred in Year 1,
regardless of whether the compensation to which the liability
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also recognized that, as a result of factors such as the substantial
increases in wage ceilings since the courts initially considered
payroll tax liabilities,195 employers might now have greater certainty about their upcoming payroll tax obligations.196 For instance, an employer of a low-wage employee could seem virtually
certain at the end of Year 1 of its payroll tax liability for earned
compensation regardless of whether the employee might receive
a modest raise in Year 2 or when the employee might use vested
vacation time in Year 2.197 Consequently, for purposes of the recurring item exception, the Service introduced a safe-harbor
method to reduce administrative burdens and controversy by deeming the all events test for a payroll tax liability satisfied in the
same year that an employer satisfies the all events test for the
related compensation liability.198
Outside the context of payroll taxes, it remains unclear how
this notion of virtual certainty for legally unenforceable obligations
works.199 Many buyers and sellers, especially those in long-term
relates is deferred compensation [(i.e., paid more than 2 ½ months
after the end of Year 1)] that is deductible under § 404 in Year 2.
Id. A commentator noted:
Because Rev. Rul. 2007-12 provides no analysis of the satisfaction of the all-events test for the deduction of the payroll
taxes on vacation and bonus pay expense, but merely stipulates that “if” the all-events test is satisfied, it is not clear how
the IRS will apply the “payment is certain” criteria in Eastman
Kodak to current payroll tax wage ceilings. Rev. Rul. 2007-12
revoked Rev. Rul. 69-587, which held that payroll taxes on
vacation and bonus pay expenses are not deductible until the
tax year the underlying compensation is paid. In light of this,
the IRS will presumably allow the deduction of the payroll taxes
on vacation and bonus pay expense under certain circumstances
for the tax year in which the underlying compensation is earned.
Godshalk, supra note 193, at 138.
195 Compare Eastman Kodak Co. v. United States, 534 F.2d 252, 259 (Ct.
Cl. 1976) ($4,800 annual FICA wage ceiling in 1965) with Press Release, Soc.
Sec. Admin., Social Security Announces 1.6 Percent Benefit Increase for 2020
(Oct. 10, 2019), https://www.ssa.gov/news/press/releases/2019/#10-2019-1
[https://perma.cc/RG9S-J59W] ($137,700 annual FICA wage ceiling in 2020).
196 See Rev. Proc. 2008-25, 2008-1 C.B. 686 § 2.09.
197 See id. § 4.02.
198 See id. § 4.01.
199 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 568–69 (illustrating
the nature of long-term contracts).
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relationships, presumably operate with the “special kind of knowledge” that provides certainty about the “absolute necessity” of respecting rights and liabilities regardless of legal enforceability.200
The buyers and sellers develop knowledge from their prior experiences together, industry practices and norms, certifications of operations from third parties, due diligence conducted before entering
into supply agreements, etc.201 The ongoing relationships that provide this special kind of knowledge also influence the contracts that
they execute and the manner in which they conduct business.202
Taxpayers thus need clarification about how certainty from actual
business dealings affects accruals under the all events tests.203
Buyers and sellers in long-term relationships might know
their rights and liabilities relative to performance obligations
even if their contracts cannot express expectations in readily enforceable terms. Sometimes contracts in these relationships define performance in general terms, such as “best efforts,” rather
than stating specific performance obligations because parties are
unsure about future operating conditions and appropriate responses to those conditions.204 Vagueness about certain aspects
of a contractual arrangement can provide needed flexibility for
dealing with future events.205 Nevertheless, based on industry
See I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 38, 155 (Nov. 7, 1979).
See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 566–67.
202 See Patience A. Crowder, Impact Transaction: Lawyering for the Public
Good Through Collective Impact Agreements, 49 IND. L. REV. 621, 661 (2016)
(“[R]elational contracts have come to be identified by a list of characteristics
that include: indefiniteness about duration; informality of language; incompleteness; imprecise performance standards; expectations of the role for social
norms and social control; reference to industry standards; and gaps in risk
allocation.” (footnotes omitted)).
203 Cf. Constructive Conditions, supra note 158, at 463 (noting the oversimplistic nature of Revenue Ruling 2007-3 on how to handle certainty).
204 See Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts,
67 VA. L. REV. 1089, 1092–93 (1981); Scott Baker & Albert Choi, Contract’s Role in
Relational Contract, 101 VA. L. REV. 559, 579–80 (2015); Gilson et al., supra note
24, at 1391 (“Uncertainty about the future makes specifying most future states—
let alone the appropriate action that is to be taken if they occur—prohibitively
costly or impossible.”); WOLFE, supra note 69, § 7-183 (“The parties have
failed to reach the illusory goal of the ‘perfectly contingent contract’ ....”).
205 See Stewart Macaulay, Non-contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOCIO. REV. 55, 64 (1963) (“Businessmen may welcome a
measure of vagueness in the obligations they assume so that they may negotiate matters [during performance] in light of the actual circumstances.”).
200
201
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norms and common experiences, a buyer and seller presumably “can
develop a shared and unambiguous understanding of what
counts as contract performance, even if they cannot convert their
definition of performance into a verifiable contract term enforceable by a court.”206 Thereafter, the parties themselves might need
to determine whether performance has occurred under these imprecise requirements207 because industry insiders, rather than
courts or other outsiders, can most easily discern if expectations
were met.208 Even if certain industries or organizations—
particularly those operating in environments with rapid innovation—might face considerable challenges in finding mutually
agreed upon expectations upfront, the contracting parties in those
contexts still likely know whether performance has occurred.209
Regulatory provisions in contracts might also rely on the
shared understandings of contracting parties to make sense of
incomplete contract terms about performance. Because regulatory
provisions usually address process-related concerns, they can
lack the detail expected, for instance, in the physical specifications
for manufactured goods.210 For example, buyers and sellers might
agree to follow sustainability principles, treat animals humanely,
or procure materials with ethical practices. The fulfillment of
these commitments might be difficult to assess objectively; however, each party might be virtually certain about the expected
performance and whether it occurred as promised. It seems necessary to account for such virtual certainty if performance will
continue to serve as an event that often fixes rights and liabilities for purposes of the all events tests.
Even if a contract defines performance obligations and
consequences of breach in detail, the stated terms might not compel
conforming performance or establish the real payment obligations.211 Studies have observed that, after parties execute contracts, they frequently operate without regard to contractual
206 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 984; see Macaulay, supra note
205, at 62 (noting how “usually there is little room for honest misunderstanding or good faith differences of opinion about the nature and quality of a seller’s performance”).
207 See Goetz & Scott, supra note 204, at 1093–94.
208 Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 984.
209 See id. at 986.
210 See id.
211 See Macaulay, supra note 205, at 61.
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terms.212 As a result, parties likely understand that the real obligations differ from the stated rights and liabilities, which creates questions about whether the all events tests would account
for the certain or the enforceable obligations.213 For example, a
buyer and long-term supplier might both realize that the buyer
lacks a credible threat to invoke its contractual right to damages
for a failure to comply with a regulatory provision because a damages claim would end their relationship.214 Even with a pattern
of nonconforming performance, the buyer might become reluctant
to terminate their relationship due to high costs of switching
suppliers and risks of developing a reputation among other suppliers as an undesirable trading partner.215 The buyer’s practical
situation could, therefore cause it to bear losses from the supplier’s noncompliance despite the buyer’s contractual entitlement
to compensation.216 The contract might attempt to mitigate this
problem by providing the buyer with an explicit right to withhold payment or impose fines for noncompliance.217 However,
the buyer might still decide to invoke this self-regulated remedy
only after repeated nonconforming performances in order to avoid
developing a heavy-handed reputation among suppliers.218 In
these situations, it is unclear if a buyer and seller should account
for the enforceable obligations stated in a contract or the virtually
certain fact of liability drawn from their practical experiences.219
Regulatory provisions can also increase interactions between
buyers and sellers in ways that potentially enhance certainty about
rights and liabilities.220 For example, some original equipment
manufacturers use process-related provisions in contracts to increase the likelihood of receiving conforming performance.221
Id.; Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1787 (describing a documented
observation “that the contours of transactors’ contracting relationship may not
be the same as the scope of the rights and duties memorialized in their written,
legally enforceable contract”).
213 See Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1787–88.
214 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 569–70.
215 See id. at 570–71.
216 See id. at 570–72.
217 See id. at 571.
218 See id. at 570–71.
219 See id.
220 See id. at 572–76.
221 See id.
212
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These provisions might require the supplier to adhere to certain
production or quality standards, allow the manufacturer to oversee
the supplier’s operations, or grant the manufacturer with certain decision-making authority over the supplier’s operations.222
These process-related provisions are necessary in dealing with
suppliers because manufacturers,
many of whom operate on a just-in-time inventory basis, do
not simply contract, wait for delivery, accept or reject, and
then sue if cure is not forthcoming. Rather, they interact with
their suppliers throughout the production, delivery, and quality
assessment process to try and catch problems sooner rather
than later and work together to solve problems rather than
threatening one another with lawsuits.223

The process-related provisions provide a structure that promotes conforming performance as the parties navigate through a
seemingly informal and cooperative relationship to achieve these
objectives rather than rely on the enforcement of formal contractual
obligations.224 The interactions and cooperation in these relationships undoubtedly influence their certainty about the receipt of
expected performances and the absoluteness of entitlements and responsibilities regardless of the formal terms of their agreements.225
Existing authorities and guidance have not explained the
extent to which virtual certainty establishes fixed rights and liabilities for purposes of the all events tests. Contracting parties
undoubtedly understand their dealings in ways that contractual
language does not always convey.226 As process-related provisions
increase interactions between parties and their reliance on shared
understandings of performance,227 the all events tests will need
to clarify how the parties’ virtual certainty about their rights
and liabilities affect tax accruals.
See id.
Id. at 576.
224 See id.
225 See id. at 578, 588–89.
226 See Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1788 (“If transactors either act or
intend to act in ways that differ from their understanding of the express
terms of their written contract, their actions are no longer ... an accurate guide to
their view of the meaning of their written agreements.”); see also Hwang &
Jennejohn, supra note 55, at 287 (noting how standards are easy to draft into
a contract but difficult to enforce due to difficulties in interpretation).
227 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 572–76.
222
223
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B. Known vs. Knowable Information About Regulatory
Compliance
The all events tests, which trace their origin to United
States v. Anderson,228 identify a fixed and determinable right or
liability from events that occur by year-end regardless of whether
a taxpayer actually knows that the events occurred.229 The Court
in Anderson had required a corporation to compute its taxable
income from all expenses accrued on its books because the Code,
at that time, had permitted a taxpayer to use an accrual method
only if the taxpayer prepared its tax return in the same manner
as it kept its books.230 The presence of book accruals in Anderson
implied that the corporation knew about the underlying events;
however, the strict book-conformity requirement made actual
knowledge irrelevant to the Court’s holding.231 But later, as the
conformity requirement relaxed,232 questions about knowledge
emerged as taxpayers, the Service, and courts tried to follow
Anderson’s dictum of accruing items when “all the events ... occur”
that satisfy both prongs of the all events tests.233
228 269 U.S. 422, 441 (1926); see I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 2010-06-031 (Sept. 30,
2009) (describing Anderson as the origin for the all events tests now contained in
the regulations); I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-31-003 (Apr. 13, 1978) (describing the
regulations as “merely a regulatory paraphrasing of a Supreme Court mandate”).
229 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-29-007 (Apr. 13, 1992).
230 See Anderson, 269 U.S. at 440–42; cf. Niles Bement Pond Co. v. United
States, 281 U.S. 357, 360 (1930).
Under the 1916 Act where the taxpayer’s books are kept and
his returns made on the accrual basis, taxes charged on the books
as they accrue must be deducted when accrued, if true income
is thus reflected .... Even if not so charged, it was competent
for the Commissioner ... to correct the taxpayer’s return by
deducting the payments in the year in which they accrued so
as to reflect true income by conforming to the dominating or
controlling character of the taxpayer’s system of accounts.
Id. (citations omitted).
231 See Anderson, 269 U.S. at 439, 441.
232 See STEPHEN F. GERTZMAN, FEDERAL TAX ACCOUNTING ¶ 4.02[3] (2d ed.
1993) (describing how book and tax accounting diverged).
233 Anderson, 269 U.S. at 441. The Court described a proper accrual for a
munitions tax expense where, “in advance of the assessment of [the] tax, all
the events may occur which fix the amount of the tax and determine the liability of the taxpayer to pay it.” Id.
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Those questions asked what effect a taxpayer’s knowledge
about the occurrence of relevant events might have in determining the appropriateness of an accrual.234 Case law responded with
a general expectation that taxpayers should base accruals on
knowable information.235 So taxpayers must accrue items arising from knowable, rather than known, events for tax purposes
even though the taxpayers’ books would not reflect the yet unknown events.236 A knowable standard has practical appeal because it prevents, for example, a taxpayer from relying on a lack
of actual knowledge—“I didn’t know and didn’t care to ask”—as
an excuse for failing to report income.237 Even so, questions persist about whether the knowable standard applies to one or both
prongs of the all events tests.238
The knowable standard plainly applies to the amount
prongs.239 In that context, the standard accepts that the ability to
determine an amount with reasonable accuracy depends on knowable facts.240 The concept of reasonable accuracy contemplates
See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-31-003 (Apr. 13, 1978).
See id. (describing judicial developments related to knowable information).
236 See Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 55 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1932).
237 See Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 31 T.C. 560, 568 (1958), acq.,
1959-2 C.B. 3.
238 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-23-008 (Mar. 12, 1980).
239 See id.
240 See id. (“A number of authorities base ascertainability on the facts
which the taxpayer knew or could reasonably be expected to know ....”). The
Service clearly associated knowable facts with the amount prong while addressing accruals for entitlements arising under a Department of Energy (“DOE”)
program during an oil crisis. See id. The program sought to allocate equitably
the benefits of certain price-controlled oil by generally requiring refiners, which
purchased a greater portion of price-controlled oil than the national average,
to buy entitlements for processing such oil from other refiners, which purchased a
lesser portion of price-controlled oil. See id. The DOE collected nationwide oil
purchase information each month and, approximately two months after the
month of the oil purchases, published a notice that named the refiners and
specified the dollar amounts of their respective obligations to buy or sell entitlements. See id. The Service found that the refiners had fixed rights and liabilities for the entitlements in the month of the oil purchases—even though a
particular refiner could not have known if it had a right or liability until the
publication of the notice—because the oil purchases, which gave rise to the
entitlements, occurred during those months. See id. But, the Service found
that the amounts were not determinable with reasonable accuracy until the
publication of the notice. See id. With respect to the amount prong, the Service noted that the calculation of the amount depended on information that was
234
235
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measuring amounts from facts or with computational methods
within a taxpayer’s reach even if a different amount would have
been determined with the advantage of perfect knowledge.241 Consequently, where a taxpayer can ascertain an amount from available facts, the taxpayer should do so.242 In contrast, where a taxpayer
could not have known the amount of an otherwise acknowledged
right or liability, the knowable standard would reject guesses
about its amount and would excuse its nonaccrual.243 The taxpayer would thereafter account for refinements to the amount of
the fixed right or liability by reporting or adjusting its income in
future periods as better information becomes available.244
Similarly, a taxpayer’s actual knowledge of relevant events
cannot effect whether a fixed right or liability exists.245 The fixed
prongs of the all events tests focus on the occurrence of events
that “fix the right” to income or “establish the fact” of liability.246
A taxpayer’s rights and liabilities exist independently of the taxpayer’s actual knowledge about them.247 Accordingly, the fixed
knowable only after the DOE published its notice, including the national average
for purchases of price-controlled oil. See id.; see also I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
38, 287 (Feb. 21, 1980).
241 See Frost Lumber Indus. v. Comm’r, 128 F.2d 693, 696 (5th Cir. 1942)
(concluding that an unalterable method of computing a purchase price at $6.25
per acre rendered the gain from the sale of land determinable with reasonable accuracy despite potential uncertainty about the number of acres sold);
Comm’r v. Old Dominion S.S. Co., 47 F.2d 148, 150 (2d Cir. 1931) (finding the
amount of a conceded liability to pay “just compensation” determinable from
past facts and established principles).
242 See Keller-Dorian Corp. v. Comm’r, 153 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1946)
(holding that the correct amount of custom duties for goods were ascertainable in
the year when the goods were imported, despite an erroneous initial computation and acceptance of the duties that required eventual reappraisals, because
the basis for the computation did not change).
243 See, e.g., United Dairy Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d
937, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (finding that a taxpayer could not determine its
liability with reasonable accuracy until a service provider supplied an itemized invoice for services rendered in a prior year), aff’d on other issues, 267
F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2001).
244 See Treas. Reg. §§ 1.451-1(a), 1.461-1(a)(2)(ii).
245 See id. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A).
246 Id.
247 See Harrisburg Steel Corp. v. United States, 142 F. Supp. 626, 630
(M.D. Pa. 1956) (“I do not feel that knowledge is a necessary ingredient in the
ascertainment of the time of income accrual for tax purposes.”).
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prongs resemble the amount prongs insofar as neither requires
actual knowledge.248
For example, the Service has ruled that a taxpayer would
improperly accrue income for mistakenly billed service charges if
the taxpayer lacked an actual right to receive them.249 The ruling involved a taxpayer that had unknowingly billed its customer for services provided to a third party as a result of the third
party’s unsanctioned use of the customer’s authorization code
(i.e., a form of identity theft).250 After the customer notified the
taxpayer about the potential code abuse, the taxpayer investigated the situation and found that the customer had no liability
for the charges.251 Even though the taxpayer discovered the mistaken charges after it had already reported them as income on a
return prepared from information available at year-end, the
Service found the original income accrual improper.252 The Service concluded that the taxpayer never satisfied the all events
test because “events ... determine whether a taxpayer has a fixed
right ... irrespective of when the taxpayer has actual knowledge
of the events fixing the right.”253 Consequently, the Service accepted that unknown events, which at best are knowable only
through investigation, control whether a fixed right or liability
exists for purposes of the all events tests.254
Although disregarding actual knowledge seems unremarkable in evaluating the need for accruals, the extent to which a
knowable standard and its implicit limitation apply to the fixed
prongs is unclear.255 By expecting taxpayers to account for
knowable information, the knowable standard implicitly recognizes that some unknown information might prove incapable of
being known by year-end.256 To the extent unknowable information rules out an accrual,257 it matters whether the knowable
See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-23-008 (1980); Treas. Reg. § 1.4461(c)(1)(ii)(A).
249 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-29-007 (Apr. 13, 1992).
250 See id.
251 See id.
252 See id.
253 Id.
254 See id.
255 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-23-008; Treas. Reg. § 1.446-1(c)(1)(ii)(A).
256 See id.
257 See GERTZMAN, supra note 232, ¶ 4.03[1][a][ii].
248
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standard applies to determining the amount of a right or liability and in identifying the existence of that right or liability.258
The frequent application of a knowable standard to the
amount prongs means that limits on knowability can clearly affect the amount of an accrual.259 Consistent with the annual accounting concept, the knowable standard reflects a long-standing
notion that taxable income should account for facts that a taxpayer knew or could reasonably have known at year end.260 Rather
than expecting perfectly informed taxpayers, courts have invoked
practical approaches for determining an amount with reasonable
accuracy based on data within a taxpayer’s possession.261 Thus
taxpayers generally must accrue amounts determinable from the
information they actually possess or could obtain with reasonable efforts.262 In contrast, the standard neither requires nor
permits accruals for fixed rights and liabilities of amounts determinable only through unreasonable efforts (i.e., unknowable
amounts).263 For example, the Tax Court found that a contracting party’s concealment of relevant information from a taxpayer
prevented the amount of income from being knowable at yearend and precluded its accrual.264
See id.
See Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 31 T.C. 560, 568 (1958), acq.,
1959-2 C.B. 3.
260 See Balt. Transfer Co. v. Comm’r, 8 T.C. 1, 7 (1947), acq., 1947-2 C.B. 1.
261 See, e.g., Cont’l Tie & Lumber Co. v. United States, 286 U.S. 290, 296 (1932)
(addressing “whether the taxpayer had in its own books and accounts data to
which it could apply the calculations required by the statute and ascertain the
quantum of the award within reasonable limits” (emphasis in original)).
262 See Resale Mobile Homes, Inc. v. Comm’r, 965 F.2d 818, 824 (10th Cir.
1992) (finding an amount of participation interest income determinable with
reasonable accuracy from amortization schedules reflecting assumed payments
from borrowers despite the fact that the finance company, which owned the
commercial paper, had the actual payment information); Schneider v. Comm’r,
65 T.C. 18, 23–24 (1975) (expecting the awareness of a liability to prompt efforts to secure an estimate about its amount from the debtor, which possessed
the data needed for the calculation), acq., 1976-2 C.B. 1. But see United Dairy
Farmers, Inc. v. United States, 107 F. Supp. 2d 937, 948 (S.D. Ohio 2000) (deferring the accrual of a liability until a service provider supplied an invoice showing the amount due for services, which the taxpayer knew were rendered to
the taxpayer in a prior year), aff’d on other issues, 267 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2001).
263 See Camilla Cotton Oil Co. v. Comm’r, 31 T.C. 560, 568 (1958), acq.,
1959-2 C.B. 3.
264 Id.
258
259
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Unfortunately, the potential application of a knowable
standard to the fixed prongs remains unclear.265 Despite occasional references to accounting for rights and liabilities reasonably
certain in fact,266 the tests emphasize unconditional rights and
obligations that exist because particular events occurred.267 It
remains unclear whether this emphasis on the existence or nonexistence of rights and liabilities268 might even entertain the idea
of basing accruals on what is reasonably knowable to a taxpayer.
For example, the all events tests do not explicitly address
how certain a taxpayer must be about the consequences of known
events.269 One might hold taxpayers to a knowable standard that
makes them responsible for figuring out the effects of known
events.270 Thus, even if one might expect lengthy court proceedings
would be needed to determine that a taxpayer became legally liable
as a result of the earlier occurrence of known events,271 the liability
If accrual is not to be required where a taxpayer’s books and
accounts, through no fault of the taxpayer, fail to supply the
data needed to make reasonable calculations, a fortiori, accrual
is not to be required when the taxpayer has no knowledge of
the underlying obligation or debt due him.
Id. The Tax Court drew a comparison to the “usual impossibility of accounting for [an embezzlement] loss in the year of concealment” in employing a
practical solution of not requiring an accrual for concealed income. Id.
265 See infra notes 266–68 and accompanying text.
266 See, e.g., C.A. Durr Packing Co. v. Shaughnessy, 81 F. Supp. 33, 35
(N.D.N.Y. 1948).
267 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-46-082 (July 21, 1978) (“The fact of the
liability is not permitted to be determined using the same reasonable accuracy
standard that is permitted in determining the amount of the expense.”).
268 See Hallmark Cards, Inc. v. Comm’r, 90 T.C. 26, 34 (1988) (“The allevents test is based on the existence or nonexistence of legal rights or obligations at the close of a particular accounting period, not on the probability—or
even absolute certainty—that such right or obligation will arise at some point
in the future.” (citing United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239,
243–44 (1987) and Brown v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 193, 201 (1934))).
269 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 243 (1987).
270 Cf. Uncasville Mfg. Co. v. Comm’r, 55 F.2d 893, 895 (2d Cir. 1932)
(finding that a computation may be unknown but that does not mean that it
is unknowable).
271 A bona fide dispute represents a condition precedent to a fixed right or
liability and would prevent its accrual. See Lucas v. Am. Code Co., 280 U.S.
445, 451–52 (1930). A taxpayer nevertheless might not definitely know about
a contractual liability even if the contracting parties never dispute it.
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arguably was equally determinable and knowable to the taxpayer
as soon as the relevant events occurred.272 The taxpayer could
have known the consequences by “correctly” applying the law.273
Conversely, one might admit that certainty about a liability—
the “fact of the liability” referenced in the regulations274—can
remain elusive and accept instead that reasonably knowable
consequences should determine the satisfaction of the all events
tests.275 Both perspectives have some merit, but no guidance clarifies whether the fixed prongs incorporate a knowable standard
that might account for how well a taxpayer appreciates the consequences of known events.
More importantly for purposes of this Article, existing
guidance does not adequately address how the potential to know
about the occurrence of particular events might affect the satisfaction of the fixed prongs.276 A taxpayer might understand the
consequences of events but could remain uncertain about whether
Cf. Uncasville, 55 F.2d at 895.
All the facts upon which the calculation [of a state tax, which
was deductible on a federal return,] depended had been fixed
before the expiration of the year 1918. Differences could arise,
and did, as to the amount of the company’s income for that
year, but they were due to the proper appraisal of its property,
and possible disputes as to the meaning of the law. The computation was uncertain, but its basis was unchangeable; it
was unknown, not unknowable on December 31, 1918.
Id.; Keller-Dorian Corp. v. Comm’r, 153 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir. 1946) (“[A]
legal error [in applying an unchanged statute to facts] cannot be used by a
taxpayer as a basis for saying that he could not have known the correct
amount of the [expenses] in the earlier years when they accrued.”).
273 Cf. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-31-003 (Apr. 13, 1978) (“These facts might not
be know[n], i.e., a taxpayer improperly computed its profits, but such facts were
knowable, i.e., it was possible for the taxpayer to compute its profits correctly.”).
274 Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2)(i)(2019).
275 See Balt. Transfer Co. v. Comm’r, 8 T.C. 1, 9 (1947) (“Changes in law
and in official interpretation of law, particularly if not reasonably expectable,
must ... be regarded as independent operative facts for accounting purposes.”),
acq., 1947-2 C.B. 1; Comment, Contested Tax Liabilities and the Annual Accounting Concept—The Japanese Trading Co. Application, 115 U. PA. L. REV.
961, 970 n.56 (1967) (criticizing the knowable approach of Uncasville as “unrealistic in assuming that the taxpayer can predict the results of litigation of
questions of either fact or law”).
276 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 243 (1987)
(laying out the all-events test but not addressing how the potential to know
about the occurrence of particular events might affect the test).
272
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the events occurred or could assume incorrectly the events occurred.
In those situations, should taxpayers determine their rights and
liabilities from what they think occurred, what they could have
discovered occurred, or what actually occurred regardless of the
potential for discovery?
The few rulings in this area show, at times, a surprising
tolerance for oblivious taxpayers and at other times, undue confidence in finding omniscient taxpayers.277 In some instances, rights
or liabilities were considered fixed based on taxpayers’ perceptions of events regardless of the actual occurrence of events.278
For example, the Service held that a manufacturer, which mistakenly shipped the wrong mix of products to a customer, had a
fixed right to income in the year of shipment.279 The Service apparently believed that the mistaken shipment satisfied its performance obligation and fixed the manufacturer’s right to income.280
The ability to look at the products and learn about the mistake,
which the customer actually discovered in the following year, played
no apparent role in determining whether the events occurred to
fix the manufacturer’s right to income.281
But with respect to other taxpayers, the fixed nature of
rights or liabilities has seemed to turn on the occurrence of inconspicuous or even unknowable events.282 Thus, in the ruling
See infra notes 278–81 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Frost Lumber Indus., Inc. v. Comm’r, 128 F.2d 693, 696 (5th
Cir. 1942) (finding a closed sale transaction and fixed right to income, despite
the formal acceptance of title in a later year, from the conduct of the parties
and noting a title attorney being “practically certain” of good title and the
seller having “a reasonable expectancy of payment”).
279 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 288, 289.
280 See id. The Service required the manufacturer to recognize income,
computed from the incorrect product mix, in the year of shipment. Id.
281 See id.; accord Celluloid Co. v. Comm’r, 9 B.T.A. 989, 1005–06 (1927)
(rejecting a proposed adjustment to accrued income to account for the delivery of defective products, which customers returned after year end, because
the taxpayer only had an anticipatory “liability” for the returned items, but
not considering whether the taxpayer had a right to receive income from delivering items with known defects), acq., 1928-1 C.B. 6.
282 See I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 80-23-008 (Mar. 12, 1980). As discussed above,
see I.R.S., supra note 238, the Service found that rights or liabilities to buy or
sell entitlements existed under a DOE program in the month during which
refiners purchased oil because nothing occurring thereafter could affect the
number or price of the entitlements. See id. But the Service concluded that
information about the rights and liabilities, including whether a particular
277
278
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described above, the Service found a taxpayer had no right to
income for mistaken service charges arising from a third party’s
unauthorized use of an access code.283 The Service based its conclusion on the fact that the necessary event—actual usage by
the customer—never occurred.284 Instead of allowing the taxpayer to report billed income in a manner consistent with its
understanding of fulfilled performances, the Service expected
the taxpayer to discern the event’s nonoccurrence even though it
had no reason to suspect the unauthorized access prior to the
customer’s discovery of the mistaken charges.285
Yet, on occasion, the Service has departed from these extreme positions and indicated a willingness to determine fixed
rights and liabilities from the occurrence of reasonably knowable
events.286 For example, in recent Chief Counsel Advice, the Service focused on unknowable information to conclude that a participant in a shared savings program should not report income in
the year it rendered medical services to Medicare beneficiaries.287
The program generally allows an Accountable Care Organization
(ACO) to receive a portion of earned cost savings if it meets quality
performance standards and generates sufficient savings while
providing medical services.288 The Service pointed to programmatic factors, including retroactive assignments of Medicare
beneficiaries and retrospective determinations of cost benchmarks,
which prevent an ACO from having access to knowable facts at
year end.289 Without knowable facts, the Service justifiably concluded that the ACO could not determine the amount of income
with reasonable accuracy.290 But the lack of knowable facts clearly
refiner was obligated to buy or to sell, was not knowable until two months
later when the DOE published the information. See id. The Service held that
the lack of available information prevented the amount, rather than the existence, of a right or liability from being knowable. See id. Accordingly, the
Service accepted that rights and liabilities could become fixed before they become knowable. See id.
283 See supra text accompanying notes 249–53.
284 Id.
285 I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-29-007 (Apr. 13, 1992).
286 See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2016-07-026 (Feb. 12, 2016).
287 See id.
288 See id.
289 See id.
290 See id.
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influenced the Service’s approach to the fixed right prong of the
all events test too.291 The Service found that the programmatic
factors left the ACO “unable to determine if it will have achieved
the necessary savings to participate” in the program’s shared
savings and accordingly deprived the ACO of a fixed right to income.292 Thus, rather than emphasize the performance of the
services, which established the quality and costs measured by
the program, the Service considered only facts knowable at year
end to determine whether the events had occurred to fix the
taxpayer’s right.293
The potential thus exists to determine the existence of
fixed rights and liabilities under a knowable standard.294 That
approach might reasonably address the practical difficulty of determining the occurrence of some events with certainty.295 The
all events tests would then preclude accruals based on unknowable
events, which might require unreasonable efforts to discover.
Unfortunately, existing authorities and guidance have inconsistently approached knowable events and have rarely characterized fixed rights and liabilities as being knowable, which makes
the applicability of a knowable standard uncertain.296
To the extent the fixed prongs of the all events tests rely on
a knowable standard, self-regulation efforts might significantly
See id.
Id. (highlighting that beneficiary information was “knowable only after” their assignment and that “ACO practitioners may not have knowledge”
of all costs). The Service stated that “[t]he amount is not fixed,” id., which
raises a question about whether the fixed prong might apply to a right to income generally or to a right to a specific amount of income. Compare Rev.
Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 288, 289 (concluding that a taxpayer could not accrue an improper amount due to a clerical mistake because the taxpayer
“[did] not have a fixed right to that amount”), with Comm’r v. Terre Haute
Elec. Co., 67 F.2d 697, 699 (7th Cir. 1933) (finding a lessor’s fixed right to income from the terms of a lease that obligated the lessee to pay income taxes
imposed on the lessor even though “[t]he amount of the taxes may be clouded
in doubt” by litigation over the amount of the imposed taxes).
293 See I.R.S. Chief Couns. Adv. 2016-07-026 (Feb. 12, 2016).
294 See id.
295 Cf. I.R.S. Tech. Adv. Mem. 78-46-082 (July 21, 1978) (finding no fixed
liability where “the taxpayer is not in a position to determine as a fact” its
liability to pay costs attributable to covered medical treatment for employees
without the filing and examination of appropriate documentation).
296 See supra notes 265–68 and accompanying text.
291
292
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affect many accruals because those efforts will change the knowable information of taxpayers.297 Regulatory provisions often impose process-related obligations, which create credence qualities
in goods and services.298 These credence qualities arise from the
use of preferred processes, such as following fair labor practices in
the manufacturing of goods; however, the qualities often “do not
inhere in the goods and cannot be observed in the end product.”299
For example, employees benefiting from a fair wage policy could
manufacture goods that are identical to the goods manufactured
by employees without such benefit.300 If a regulatory provision
in a supply agreement requires compliance with the fair wage
policy, then the buyer might find compliance impossible or exceedingly difficult to assess with respect to delivered goods.301
Where compliance with the policy represents a condition on the
obligation to pay or a performance obligation for purposes of the
all events tests,302 the buyer would normally lack a supportable
basis for concluding that the unobservable compliance either did
or did not occur.303 But self-regulation also frequently introduces
monitoring aspects, which have the potential to convert previously unknowable information, such as compliance with the fair
wage policy, into something knowable.304
See infra notes 303–14.
See Tracey M. Roberts, The Rise of Rule Four Institutions: Voluntary
Standards, Certification and Labeling Systems, 40 ECOLOGY L. Q. 107, 123–
24 n.78 (2013). For example, fair labor regulations lead to fair labor practices
which lead to goods that have been produced with an ethical provenance, a
credence quality. See id.
299 Id.
300 See id. (“Examples of goods with this type of credence quality include
goods that are ... manufactured using fair labor practices.”).
301 See id. (“Even where desirable qualities might inhere in the end product, consumers may also be unable to determine whether their preferences
are being met because testing for these desirable qualities would be prohibitively expensive.”).
302 See supra Sections I.A.1 and I.A.2.
303 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1604 (noting that breaches of regulatory
provisions are often first discovered during inspections and audits).
304 See id. (explaining how, with commercial contracts, the supplier may be
monitored for breaches and, if found, the previously unknown information is
communicated to the buyer who can take corrective action).
297
298
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Monitoring regulatory compliance becomes necessary because having a contract impose process-related obligations is not
enough to ensure compliance.305 Companies might ignore their
obligations in the absence of verification and enforcement because the beneficial activities required by many regulatory standards increase the costs of these profit-maximizing companies.306
For example, numerous multinational buyers have discovered
that the actual conduct of their suppliers has deviated greatly
from the suppliers’ contractual promises to abide by particular
codes of conduct.307 Due to the economic and reputational risks
associated with having such conduct exposed publicly, many
buyers take measures to verify and enforce compliance within a
supply chain in addition to seeking the promises of their suppliers to comply.308
In many instances, buyers secure inspection rights in order
to verify compliance with regulatory and other standards.309 The
master supply agreements of original equipment manufacturers,
for example, “give buyers the right to: inspect the supplier’s plant
with or without notice, review and audit its quality control systems and quality control reports, and audit its books and/or other
records.”310 Regardless of whether performed by a buyer or a
third party, an audit of a supply chain provides a confidential
mechanism for monitoring conduct proactively and determining
appropriate safeguards before unfavorable conduct becomes publicly known.311
The audits and other mechanisms used for inspection
provide buyers with access to considerable amounts of information.312 An audit of suppliers, for example, should provide a
buyer with information about compliance with regulatory provisions and often will provide information about compliance with
See Lin, supra note 20, at 723 (having a contract or code of compliance
does not mean compliance is guaranteed).
306 See Graeme Auld et al., Transnational Private Governance Between the
Logics of Empowerment and Control, 9 REG. & GOVERNANCE 108, 111 (2015).
307 See Lin, supra note 20, at 723.
308 See id. at 727.
309 See id. at 726 (noting a preference for verification through auditing).
310 Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583 (footnotes omitted).
311 See Lin, supra note 20, at 726–27.
312 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583.
305

376 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:329
general performance obligations too.313 Information about events
within the supply chain then would become known, as a result of
the audit, or could become reasonably knowable, as a result of
the inspection right (even if not exercised).314
The consequence of having additional information made
available to taxpayers through rights of inspection depends on
whether the fixed prongs of the all events tests follow a knowable
standard.315 At a minimum, taxpayers presumably could not ignore
known information discovered through audits.316 For example, if
an audit reveals noncompliance with regulatory provisions, then
the taxpayer should determine a fixed right or liability by accounting for the effect of known noncompliance on any conditions or
performance obligations.
Unknown, but knowable, information would cause more
problems if fixed rights and liabilities are determined from
knowable events. A right of inspection could place a taxpayer in
an unenviable position where a supplier’s noncompliance was
reasonably knowable, but not yet known. Expecting the taxpayer
to account for unknown information can seem unrealistic and
unfair; however, allowing the taxpayer to account for only
known information can create opportunities for abuse and runs
counter to the idea that events—rather than knowledge—fix
rights and liabilities.317 As noted above, authorities and guidance have yet to definitively state whether a knowable standard
applies to the fixed prongs of the all events tests.318 Without
such clarification, taxpayers have little indication about how to
account for the increasing amount of information becoming
knowable through the insertion of inspection rights into many
regulatory provisions.319
See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1611 (“While the main focus [of monitoring]
is on the regulatory compliance, clearly the overall contractual performance is
subject to more intense monitoring than the ordinary commercial contract.”).
314 Cf. Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583; Lin, supra note
20, at 727 (audit produced information).
315 See supra notes 265–68 and accompanying text.
316 See Beyond Relational Contracts, supra note 89, at 583; Cafaggi, supra
note 12, at 1611 (addressing information discovered from audits and monitoring).
317 See United States v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 481 U.S. 239, 243–44 (1987).
318 See supra Section I.B.
319 See id.
313
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II.ACCEPTANCE REQUIREMENTS AS CONDITIONS
UNDER THE ALL EVENTS TESTS
The all events tests can and should accommodate selfregulation in sales and other transactions better. The concerns
expressed above about conditions, performance, virtual certainty,
and knowable information admittedly indicate that someone needs
a hobby. But the all events tests should provide a sound basis
for tax accruals regardless of the complexity of a transaction.
That basis is lacking insofar as the tests emphasize the significance of contractual promises for determining rights and liabilities,320 but applications of the tests can simultaneously gloss
over uncertainty about the fulfillment of those promises.321 The
applications look haphazard in the selection of only certain aspects of complex relationships in determining what events might
affect rights and liabilities. Busy practitioners might understandably determine accruals for sales of goods and services by
ignoring the requirements of increasingly common regulatory
provisions;322 however, the all events tests should provide a sound
basis for such accruals apart from practical needs to file timely
returns. This Part explores how the all events tests could regain
soundness by recognizing implied acceptance requirements as
conditions to rights and liabilities.
A. Acceptance as a Condition
An express requirement for customer acceptance has generally been regarded as an event that must occur before a right
or liability can become fixed under the all events tests.323 For
example, the Service has found that a seller lacked a fixed right
See, e.g., Decision, Inc. v. Comm’r, 47 T.C. 58, 63 (1966) (noting how a
taxpayer lacked a fixed right to receive income, after changing terms in its
contracts with customers, under the all events test), acq., 1967-2 C.B. 2.
321 See, e.g., Harkins v. Comm’r, 81 T.C.M. (CCH) 1547, 1551 (2001) (finding a
fixed right to income, where payments were “earned under the agreement
only if the [taxpayer] was in full compliance with the performance requirements,” because “[t]here is no evidence in the record indicating that the [taxpayer] did not perform as called for in the agreement”); GERTZMAN, supra
note 232, ¶ 4.03[1][b] (noting that courts require accruals because “the taxpayer’s compliance with its agreement will generally be presumed”).
322 See Cafaggi, supra note 12, at 1571–72.
323 See also infra note 325 and accompanying text.
320
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to amounts billed by the seller—but withheld by a buyer—for
delivered goods where such amounts were not payable under their
contract until the buyer accepted the goods.324 Required acceptance,
which completes a sale, thus can function as a condition precedent to a fixed right or liability.325
Yet the Service has minimized the significance of express
acceptance in certain severable service contracts.326 The Service
had examined a corporation’s milestone-based contracts that obligated the federal government to make individual milestone
payments only after the government inspected and accepted each
completed severable service.327 Despite recognizing acceptance as a
condition precedent to each payment (i.e., a condition to an amount
becoming due), the Service noted how the corporation completed
the milestone services and earned the corresponding portions of
its income before the government accepted the completed work.328
Under the Service’s formulaic approach of identifying a fixed
right to income upon the earliest of it being due, paid, or earned,329
the Service found that the rights to income were fixed when
earned through the completion of each severable, but unaccepted,
performance obligation in the contacts.330
See Rev. Rul. 69-314, 1969-1 C.B. 139; accord Rev. Proc. 2019-43, 2019-48
I.R.B. 1107 § 16.09 (listing, among the methods eligible for automatic consent, a
change in the treatment of retainages to a method consistent with the holding of
Revenue Ruling 69-314 with respect to receivables or payables).
325 See, e.g., Ringmaster, Inc. v. Comm’r, 1962 T.C.M. (P-H) ¶ 62-187, at
1134 (“A sale contract which makes acceptance of the subject matter dependent
upon inspection or testing by the purchaser creates such a condition precedent and prevents accrual of the purchase price by the seller until such tests
and inspections have been made.”), dismissed per curiam, 319 F.2d 860 (8th
Cir. 1963); Webb Press Co., v. Comm’r, 3 B.T.A. 247, 253 (1925) (finding the
completion of a sale contingent on the purchaser’s testing and acceptance of a
good), acq., 1927-1 C.B. 6; Priv. Let. Rul. 2003-10-003 (Mar. 7, 2003); cf. Priv.
Let. Rul. 98-23-003 (Feb. 18, 1998) (finding no fixed right to income until customers choose to purchase acceptable goods under the taxpayer’s policy that
creates no obligation to purchase a finished good “with which the customer is
not completely satisfied”).
326 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-03-079 (Jan. 16, 2009).
327 See id.
328 See id.
329 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
330 See Tech. Adv. Mem. 2009-03-079 (Jan. 16, 2009).
324
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This approach toward milestones is generally troubling
for all taxpayers and especially problematic in the context of
self-regulated relationships.331 It is troubling because the Service found an unconditional right to receive income while simultaneously recognizing a conditional obligation to pay it.332 That
odd result flows from approaching the fixed prong with a formula333
without appreciating that acceptance was an event that ultimately
determined the corporation’s right to receive the income.334 Acceptance constrained the right, which is the focus of the all events
test, even though the corporation could do the work to earn the
income before acceptance occurred.335 An approach for accruals
that relies on activities targeted by a formula, rather than assessing
rights established by events, leads to troubling results.336
More importantly, for self-regulated relationships, the
willingness to rely on performance for identifying a fixed right
placed too much emphasis on the corporation’s purported completion of its work.337 The parties expressed their mutual intention to regulate certain obligations through acceptance.338 The
all events tests should not discount that intention and regard
the corporation’s tendered performance as sufficient to fix their
respective rights and liabilities. The tendering of performance
conveys nothing more than a unilateral assertion of compliance
with required performance obligations.339 The all events tests
should not elevate the significance of that unilateral act where the
parties explicitly made it subject to acceptance by the buyer. Otherwise, the tests would invite speculation about the virtual certainty of compliance,340 knowable aspects of noncompliance,341 and
other complications in deciding whether the seller had completed
See Constructive Conditions, supra note 158, at 443 (2009).
See id.
333 See id. at 438–63 (2009) (describing the Service’s oversimplified standards for income and expense recognition under the all events tests).
334 See id. at 443.
335 See id.
336 See id.
337 See id. at 448–52.
338 See id. at 350.
339 See id. at 350–51.
340 See supra Section I.A.3.
341 See supra Section I.B.
331
332
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its performance as promised.342 Regrettably, the current tendency
to associate fixed rights and liabilities with unilateral acts of asserted performance is incompatible with the increasing efforts of
contracting parties to regulate often-unobservable aspects of
their relationships.
In any event, the Service’s peculiar approach to express
acceptance requirements for severable services remains at odds
with the significance attached to such requirements for sales of
goods.343 In both contexts, prior to a buyer’s acceptance, the seller’s
right to income should remain contingent on acceptance occurring
even if the seller has tendered performance. But the approach taken
for severable services mistakenly suggests that express acceptance
requirements produce different consequences for sales of services than for sales of goods.344
Despite permitting an express acceptance requirement to
operate as a condition, the all events tests have evolved without
attributing similar significance to implied acceptance requirements.345 Reading implied conditions into agreements might
seem unnecessary for tax purposes given that, if a party has performed as promised, the performance alone should fix associated
rights and liabilities. However, the UCC346—and to some degree,
the common law347—recognize acceptance as implied conditions
See infra Section II.B.
Cf. IRS Field Serv. Adv. 1999 FSA LEXIS 382 (June 25, 1999) (distinguishing the permitted deferral of income recognition until a sale of merchandise,
where such sale occurs upon the acceptance of the goods, from the required immediate recognition of income from sales of services because, “while ... customers
may dispute the charges for the services, the services have been provided”).
344 Id.
345 See supra Section I.A.2.
346 See infra notes 350–65 and accompanying text.
347 Courts insert constructive conditions into contracts to make, for example, a buyer’s obligation to pay depend on a seller’s completed performance.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 226; id. § 226 cmt. c. (AM. L.
INST. 1981). These conditions help preserve expectations about the exchange
such that the buyer would not have to pay unless the seller actually fulfills
its promise. For this purpose, the seller’s substantial performance is regarded
as equivalent to full performance where the seller has deviated in only trivial,
minor, or nonessential ways from its promise. See id. § 237 cmt. d. The doctrine of
substantial performance thereby protects a seller that makes a good faith effort
to perform against the potential forfeiture that could otherwise result if an unreasonable buyer would reject any performance falling short of an unobtainable
342
343
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on payment obligations. Although legal enforceability might not
serve as a touchstone for fixed rights and liabilities under the all
events tests,348 the tests should operate by consistently respecting the conditions expressed by contracting parties and those
conditions implied by law.349
For example, Article 2 of the UCC, which applies to transactions in goods,350 recognizes a seller’s obligation to deliver goods
and a buyer’s obligation to accept the goods before paying for
them as promised.351 Rather than regarding the buyer’s payment
standard of perfection. See Larry A. DiMatteo, Equity’s Modification of Contract: An Analysis of the Twentieth Century’s Equitable Reformation of Contract Law, 33 NEW ENG. L. REV. 265, 299 (1999); see also William H. Lawrence,
Appropriate Standards for a Buyer’s Refusal to Keep Goods Tendered by a
Seller, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1635, 1640 (1994) (noting that the substantial
performance doctrine does not apply to the sale of goods under the UCC,
which uses the perfect tender rule, because a breaching seller can often avoid
forfeiture by reselling nonconforming goods whereas a seller of nonconforming services, for example, usually cannot resell the services). Therefore, insofar as the seller substantially performs, the constructive condition is deemed
satisfied and the buyer becomes obligated to pay the contract price (albeit
reduced by damages for any defective performance). The common law thus
“provides that substantial performance mandates acceptance” by the buyer.
DiMatteo, supra, at 299.
Conversely, if the seller materially breaches its performance obligation
(i.e., fails to substantially perform as promised), then the unsatisfied constructive
condition prevents the buyer from having an obligation to pay. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (AM. L. INST. 1981). But the buyer could still
accept—through word or deed—the seller’s nonconforming performance. See
id. §§ 246(1), 247. The buyer has discretion either to (1) assert that the seller
breached the contract, which prevents the buyer’s payment from becoming
due, or (2) accept the otherwise defective performance, which waives the condition on the payment obligation. Because acceptance would waive an unsatisfied condition, the buyer’s acceptance rather than the seller’s performance
would establish the obligation to pay the contract price (without forfeiting
rights to damages for the defective performance). See id. § 246 cmt. b.
Therefore, the common law finds a payment obligation either where a buyer
should accept full or substantial performance as a matter of course or where a
buyer has accepted materially nonconforming performance. See id. § 246.
348 See supra notes 163–72 and accompanying text.
349 See Constructive Conditions, supra note 158, at 469–70.
350 See U.C.C. § 2-102 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
351 See id. § 2-301. The parties’ obligations should consider “usage of trade,
course of dealing and performance, and the general background of circumstances.” Id. § 2-301 cmt.

382 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 12:329
obligation as entirely independent of the seller’s delivery obligation,352 the UCC generally permits the buyer to inspect and accept
the goods before the obligation to pay ripens.353 The seller’s right to
receive and the buyer’s obligation to make payment thus depend
on an implied requirement of the buyer’s prior acceptance.354
The implied acceptance requirement meshes with the perfect tender rule under the UCC.355 The perfect tender rule permits a buyer to reject, in good faith, nonconforming goods, even
where nonconformity results from a seller’s trivial deviation
from promised performance.356 This rule incorporates “the proposition that the seller’s complete performance is a warranty and
a condition precedent to the buyer’s obligation to pay.”357 The
UCC implies an acceptance requirement to preserve a buyer’s
See id. § 2-301 cmt. (“This section uses the term ‘obligation’ in contrast
to the term ‘duty’ in order to provide for the ‘condition’ aspects of delivery and
payment ....”).
353 See id. §§ 2-513(1), 2-607(1).
354 See id. § 2-607 cmt. 1 (“[O]nce the buyer accepts a tender the seller acquires a right to its price on the contract terms.”).
355 See infra note 356 and accompanying text.
356 See U.C.C. §§ 2-601, 2-106 cmt. 2 (describing a “policy of requiring exact performance by the seller of his obligations as a condition to his right to
require acceptance”). The perfect tender rule does not apply to goods delivered pursuant to an installment contract. See id. § 2-601. An installment contract authorizes or requires the delivery of goods in separate lots, where the
buyer can accept each lot separately. See id. § 2-612(1). A buyer can reject an
individual installment only where nonconformity “substantially impairs the
value of that installment and cannot be cured.” Id. § 2-612(2). Consequently,
unless the nonconformity “substantially impairs the value of the whole contract,” the buyer must accept the nonconforming installment upon receiving
the seller’s adequate assurances of its cure. Id. §§ 2-612(2)–(3). The heightened standard of substantial impairment arguably helps preserve a longterm contractual relationship that might break down if a buyer could reject
an installment for trivial deviations, see Lawrence, supra note 347, at 1654–
56, or if the buyer seeks to benefit from market prices that declined over the
period between contract execution and the delivery of the installment, which
might exceed a comparable period for a single-delivery contract. See George
L. Priest, Breach and Remedy for the Tender of Nonconforming Goods Under
the Uniform Commercial Code: An Economic Approach, 91 HARV. L. REV. 960,
972 (1978).
357 Steven W. Feldman, Recession, Restitution, and the Principle of Fair
Redress: A Response to Professors Brooks and Stremitzer, 47 VAL. U. L. REV.
399, 413 (2013).
352
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right to reject tendered goods under this rule and to establish
acceptance as the conditional event for an obligation to pay for
goods that have not been rejected.358 To achieve these objectives
in the absence of a buyer’s explicit approval, the UCC will infer
acceptance from the buyer’s conduct, which might include failing
to reject goods after having a reasonable opportunity to inspect
them or acting in a manner contrary to the seller’s ownership of
the goods.359 Implied acceptance requirements thereby help establish a mutually acknowledged payment obligation insofar as
the actions of both parties appear consistent with their understanding that performance has occurred as promised.360
Significantly, acceptance under the UCC can establish an
unconditional payment obligation for nonconforming goods.361 A
buyer can knowingly or unknowingly accept—expressly or implicitly—nonconforming goods tendered by a seller where the
goods were otherwise rejectable under the perfect tender rule.362
Such acceptance gives the seller a right to the agreed upon
price363 even though the buyer may still seek damages related to
the nonconformity.364 Acceptance thus establishes a payment
obligation for goods as tendered regardless of whether the seller
performed as promised.365
Because current applications of the all events tests fail to
recognize implied acceptance requirements, they allow a unilateral
See U.C.C. § 2-601.
See id. §§ 2-606(1)(b)–(c); see also id. § 2-606 cmt. 1 (using a buyer’s
“words, action, or silence when it is time to speak” as the basis for finding
acceptance).
360 See id. §§ 2-607(1)–(2).
361 Id.
362 See id. § 2-601; see also id. § 2-602 cmt. 1 (“A tender or delivery of goods
made pursuant to a contract of sale, even though wholly non-conforming, requires affirmative action by the buyer to avoid acceptance.”).
363 See U.C.C. § 2-607(1); see also Justin Sweet, Completion, Acceptance
and Waiver of Claims: Back to Basics, 17 FORUM 1312, 1314 (1982) (analogizing
a tender of nonconforming goods to an offer of a lesser amount in full satisfaction of a debt, which the creditor could choose to accept).
364 See U.C.C. §§ 2-714(1), 2-601 cmt. 1 (“A buyer accepting a non-conforming
tender is not penalized by the loss of any remedy otherwise open to him.”). A
buyer must notify the seller within a reasonable time after the buyer discovers or should have discovered the nonconformity; otherwise, the buyer’s claim
for damages is barred. See id. § 2-607(3).
365 Id. § 2-607(1).
358
359
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assertion of compliance with a performance obligation to fix a right
to income and liability to pay.366 These performance-focused applications favor an approach whereby one party’s claimed performance is regarded as enough to fix the rights and liabilities
under an agreement.367 If the other party objects to the performance, current applications of the tests view a resulting dispute—
which necessarily arises after performance has occurred—as giving
rise to an unsatisfied condition precedent that prevents or postpones an accrual of income or deduction.368 In essence, the tests
See supra Section I.A.2.
See supra notes 100–05 and accompanying text.
368 Existing authorities and guidance find performance sufficient to fix an
associated right to income and liability to pay. See supra Section I.A. Inexplicably, they also construe a post-performance dispute as giving rise to an unsatisfied condition precedent that leaves the right and liability unsettled,
even though the earlier performance should have presumably fixed them. See
Lucas v. American Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 451–52 (1930). One might instead
question whether a legitimate dispute between the parties makes evident
that a party failed to perform as promised and that such failure—rather than
the dispute—prevents each party from having a fixed right or liability.
Nevertheless, this approach of constructing a dispute-resolution condition
offers a practical way to deal with questionable performance. For example, if
a seller unknowingly tendered nonconforming performance and the buyer
rightfully rejected the performance, then the condition precedent approach
easily and properly postpones accruals until the resolution of any resulting
dispute. See supra Section I.A. The construction of a condition produces a
manageable deferral by shifting the focus of the all events tests to the observable unresolved status of the dispute and away from the contested fulfillment of the promise. Conversely, where a dispute arises from the buyer’s
wrongful rejection of the seller’s conforming performance, the condition precedent approach thankfully avoids dealing with unknown, but potentially
knowable, facts about performance. See supra Section I.A. Although a performance-focused all events test might justifiably find the occurrence of knowable performance sufficient to fix a right or liability, the condition precedent
approach understandably opts for the ease of just postponing accruals until
resolution of the dispute
The recognition of implied acceptance requirements under the all events
tests could offer a similarly useful but theoretically preferable approach for
accruals. Like dispute resolution, acceptance works as a readily identifiable
marker of the event needed to fix a right or liability. See supra notes 323–25
and accompanying text. However, acceptance provides a uniform, principled
marker for both conforming and nonconforming performances. This consistency is
lacking in applications of the all events tests that initially link rights and liabilities to performances but eventually couple them with the resolution of
366
367
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get applied by fabricating a condition tied to resolving a dispute
about performance and simultaneously ignoring the legally implied requirement to have such performance accepted.369 In
short, current applications of the tests do not require acceptable
performance to fix a right or liability; however, they will abandon their performance-focused approaches370 if someone actually
objects to the performance.371
If parties were assured of receiving promised performances,
then the all events tests could justifiably and feasibly treat the
completion of those performances as fixing rights and liabilities.372 However, taxpayers know that performances vary from
promises, and promises often address expectations about farranging operational activities that provide many opportunities
for noncompliance.373 As a result, the difficulty of applying a performance-focused all events test where, for example, delivered
goods fail to meet agreed upon physical specifications (e.g., goods
fabricated with substandard steel) starts to compound where
goods meet physical specifications but conflict with processrelated performance expectations (e.g., goods fabricated under
prohibited, abusive labor practices).374 Moreover, where the parties seek to preserve relationships and work together to resolve
nonconformity issues, a performance-focused analysis would become administratively complex if consideration is given to the
parties’ willingness to tolerate certain performance deviations in
order to sustain the relationship.375 It is foreseeable that these
disputes as if performance has lost its relevance. Moreover, the approach of
constructing dispute-resolution conditions has yet to explain how to account
for nonconforming performance if a dispute (i.e., the unsatisfied condition
precedent) does not arise until a subsequent taxable year. See Rev. Rul. 200310, 2003-1 C.B. 289. An acceptance-based approach could find a fixed right or
liability upon the acceptance of nonconforming performance even if a dispute
might arise later.
369 Cf. Dravo Corp. v. United States, 348 F.2d 542, 545 (Ct. Cl. 1965).
370 Id. (noting a departure from traditional accrual accounting for contested
liabilities).
371 Id.
372 See Rev. Rul. 98-39, 1998-2 C.B. 199.
373 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 288–89.
374 See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text.
375 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 290 (questioning how a course of
dealings might affect an analysis under the all events tests with respect to
defective products).
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difficulties could lead to a performance-focused analysis that
finds a fixed right or liability from a semblance of performance
cobbled together from the absence of a dispute and an assumed
willingness to disregard nonconformity.376 Ambiguity about how
far parties can deviate from their promises and still fix rights
and liabilities makes the continued devotion to performance-focused
applications perplexing.377 The all events tests could instead operate more soundly by asking whether the buyer accepted performance in whatever manner tendered.
By recognizing implied acceptance conditions, the all
events tests could sidestep many complex issues in dealing with
performance. Once acceptance occurs, it does not matter whether
performance occurred as promised; what activities were ministerial; whether conformity or nonconformity was knowable to or
virtually certain from either party; or how the parties might deal
with nonconformity in ongoing relationships.378 Like express acceptance, implied acceptance of tendered performance would
serve as an identifiable event that can fix the rights and liabilities of contracting parties for tax purposes in self-regulated and
other contexts.379
Furthermore, the recognition of implied acceptance requirements would better align the all events tests with the intentions
of parties that self-regulate and the legal rights and liabilities of
those parties.380 Self-regulation involves important aspects of
standard setting, compliance verification, and enforcement.381
These efforts demonstrate an intention to define and control acceptable performance rather than to hope that a party will tender
See id. at 289 (finding that a manufacturer had a fixed right to income
under the all events test in the year it shipped too many goods because, upon
discovery in a subsequent taxable year, the customer did not dispute that the
manufacturer had shipped the wrong quantity of items and the customer
agreed to pay for the excess shipment). But cf. Van Dorn Co. v. Future Chem.
& Oil Corp., 753 F.2d 565, 574 (7th Cir. 1985) (recognizing a buyer’s legal obligation to pay for an excess quantity of delivered goods under the Illinois
Commercial Code because the buyer had implicitly accepted them by failing
to reject the nonconforming excess).
377 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289.
378 See Just Enough, supra note 56, at 474.
379 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289.
380 See Constructive Conditions, supra note 158, at 447–48.
381 See McAllister, supra note 5, at 306–07.
376
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conforming performance. The all events tests should likewise focus
on rights and liabilities established by the acceptance of performance instead of looking for rights and liabilities under an assumption that parties might perform as promised. This approach of
requiring acceptance would also provide a more logical connection between the unconditional rights and liabilities under the
all events tests and the legal rights and liabilities of contracting
parties. For instance, postponing a seller’s accrual of income until the buyer accepts performance makes more sense than saying
the seller’s performance established an unconditional right to
receive income for tax purposes despite the fact that the buyer
has no legal obligation to pay for the performance (or possibly
even accept the performance). The recognition of implied acceptance as conditions to rights and liabilities under the all events
tests would better align tax accruals with the reality of many
business transactions.
B. Disputes About Performance
In addition to recognizing that a buyer might accept either conforming or nonconforming performance, the all events
tests must accommodate disputes about potentially nonconforming aspects of performance. Despite accepting a seller’s tender, a
buyer might assert that its payment obligation differs from the
contract price because the seller did not fulfill its contractual
promises.382 Consequently, the all events tests must anticipate
and account for disputes about nonconforming performance that
might ultimately determine what, if anything, the buyer must
pay for the seller’s actual performance.
As noted above, current applications of the all events tests
treat a bona fide dispute as establishing an unsatisfied condition
precedent that generally prevents or postpones accruals of the
promised payment by both the buyer and seller.383 Therefore, a
dispute about allegedly nonconforming performance presumably
forestalls an accrual prior to its resolution.384 Once, for example,
the parties reach a settlement or a court enters a final judgment
See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289.
Id.
384 Id.
382
383
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about the payment obligation, the resolution satisfies the condition
precedent and establishes the amount and timing of accruals related to the tendered performance.385
By treating a dispute as an unsatisfied condition precedent, current applications of the all events tests might neglect
obligations to pay that were fixed by acceptance. For example, a
buyer’s acceptance of nonconforming goods establishes the buyer’s obligation to pay the full contract price under the UCC.386
The acceptance compels the buyer to return performance through
payment and precludes the buyer from rejecting the goods later
due to the nonconformity.387 The buyer can still seek a remedy,
including damages, for the nonconformity;388 however, the buyer
must pay the agreed upon price for the accepted goods.389 Therefore, a dispute about allegedly nonconforming performance for
accepted goods will normally involve a buyer’s entitlement to a
remedy rather than the buyer’s responsibility to pay the contract price.390
Therefore, even for disputed performance, the all events tests
should take a payment obligation into account when goods or services are accepted.391 Like the UCC, the all events tests should
recognize that acceptance fixes the obligation to pay a determinable amount.392 Any dispute about nonconforming aspects should
See H. Liebes & Co. v. Comm’r, 90 F.2d 932, 938–39 (9th Cir. 1937).
See U.C.C. § 2-607(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
387 See id. § 2-607(2); see also Kalzip, Inc. v. TL Hill Constr., LLC, 80 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. 2d 832 (M.D. Fla. 2013) (“[E]ven if the delivery of conforming goods
could be deemed a condition precedent, [the buyer] waived compliance with
that condition precedent by accepting the goods. Since [the buyer] accepted
the goods, it is limited to an action for breach.”).
388 See U.C.C. § 2-714(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
389 See id. § 2-607(1).
390 See id.
391 Under the common law, as long as either the buyer must accept the
seller’s immaterial deviations or the buyer has chosen to accept the seller’s
material breaches, the buyer becomes obligated to pay the contract price despite retaining the right to seek damages for nonconforming performance. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 246 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
392 Current applications of the all events tests require parties to accrue the
uncontested portion of a payment obligation. See Johnson v. Comm’r, 6 T.C.M.
255, 257–58 (1947). The partial accrual of a promised payment could contradict the
fact that the buyer—without surrendering any right to a remedy—assumes legal
385
386
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not delay accruals even though the dispute might result in an adjustment to the amount paid, such as through a setoff.393 An unresolved dispute might affect the amount eventually paid; however, the possibility of adjustment does not change the need to
account for rights and liabilities fixed by acceptance.394
The resolution of a dispute about nonconforming performance for accepted goods or services might accordingly require a
post-acceptance adjustment.395 When they eventually resolve
their dispute, the contracting parties should preferably account
for any difference between their prior accruals resulting from
the acceptance and any modified obligation resulting from the
dispute resolution.396 This approach seems particularly desirable
responsibility for the entire purchase price by accepting the tendered performance. Cf. PATRICIA F. FONSECA & JOHN R. FONSECA, WILLISTON ON SALES
§ 25:32, 820 (5th ed. 2006) (“Conformity of the goods tendered by the seller to
the buyer will be presumed after the buyer has made an acceptance and the
burden of establishing any breach is on that buyer.”).
393 See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-717 (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017) (“The
buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to do so may deduct all or any
part of the damages resulting from any breach of the contract from any part
of the price still due under the same contract.”). Under the UCC, acceptance
establishes a payment obligation of the contract price less any damages for
nonconforming performance. See Tegrant Alloyd Brands, Inc. v. Merch. of
Tennis, Inc., 73 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 2d (Callaghan) 486 (Jan. 26, 2011) (“Although
the seller’s breach does not excuse the contractual obligations of the buyer,
the buyer is permitted to withhold from the purchase price its actual damages
and breaches its obligations only to the extent the amount withheld exceeds
its damages.” (citing Baccus Indus., Inc. v. Frontier Mech. Contractors, 36
S.W.3d 579, 585–86 (Tex. App. 2000))). Disputes about nonperformance relate
to the amount of the payment obligation rather than the existence of the obligation. Accordingly, the parties should take the payment obligation into account
when acceptance occurs and account for potential damages in determining
the amount with reasonable accuracy. See Cont’l Tie & Lumber Co. v. United
States, 286 U.S. 290, 295–96 (1932).
394 See Pac. Vegetable Oil Corp. v. Comm’r, 26 T.C. 1, 19 (1956) (“[T]he
contingency of having to make adjustments in invoice prices [due to differences between the weight of delivered items and the weight specified in a
sales contract] does not prevent the accrual of income in the year in which the
right to income under the sales contract became fixed.” (citation omitted)),
rev’d on other issues, 251 F.2d 682 (9th Cir. 1957).
395 See id. at 18.
396 See id.
Although adjustment might be made in the amount of the invoice price after determination of [the delivered items’] weight,
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given that parties might resolve certain claims about nonconforming performance through nonmonetary means.397 For example, in lieu of monetary damages for an alleged breach, a buyer
and seller might agree to operational changes that encourage
future compliance with regulatory provisions and help preserve
their long-term relationship. A post-acceptance adjustment would
appropriately reflect any resolution about a payment obligation
without altering the fact that acceptance fixed the underlying
right or liability.398
A post-acceptance adjustment for the resolution of a dispute offers a straightforward way to apply the all events tests.
The current approach of treating a dispute as a condition precedent introduces uncertainty, for example, where a claim of nonconforming performance arises from a discovery occurring in a
year after goods or services were provided (i.e., how does a Year
2 dispute affect a right established by Year 1 performance?).399
The all events tests should not have to resort to a post-year-end
construction of unsatisfied condition precedent to address an alleged nonconformity. Instead, common sense suggests the parties
should accrue income and expense items during the year goods
this was, we believe, only part of and due to the seller’s warranty, specific or implied, that it would deliver the quantity
called for by the sales contract[ ] and that ... the buyer would
not be charged for more goods than he received.
Id.; David J. Joseph Co. v. Comm’r, 136 F.2d 410, 411 (5th Cir. 1943).
In practically every contract of sale for merchandise there is
an implied warranty of quality and quantity of the merchandise
sold, for the breach of which the merchant would be liable to
the buyer, but the breach would not develop prior to delivery,
and the right to demand damages or a refund would not accrue until its discovery.
Id.
397 See Merchant Law, supra note 154, at 1798.
398 See id. at 1808.
399 See Rev. Rul. 2003-10, 2003-1 C.B. 289 (requesting comments about the
application of section 451 to shipments of defective products where disputes
arise in a subsequent year). A condition precedent would not arise unless the
parties dispute the nonconformity. See supra Section I.A.2. If the parties
agree that nonconforming performance occurred (i.e., no dispute exists), then
they must still determine whether the failure to perform as promised could
have fixed rights and liabilities in an earlier year under the current performance-focused applications of the all events tests. See id.
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or services are accepted (buyers must pay for what they accept)
and report adjustments separately during any year disputes
about nonconforming performance are resolved (the amounts owed
might change even though the obligations to pay would not).
Finally, the all events tests should restrict the use of conditions for nonconforming performance to situations where nonconformities extinguish payment obligations. For example, the
UCC permits a buyer of goods to revoke a prior acceptance if
nonconformity substantially impairs the value of the goods to the
buyer.400 Unless the buyer reasonably but mistakenly assumed—
prior to acceptance—that the seller would cure a known nonconformity, revocation is restricted to situations where the buyer’s
acceptance was reasonably induced by either the difficulty of
discovering the nonconformity prior to acceptance or the seller’s
assurances about performance.401 Upon a timely notification of
revocation, the UCC treats a revocation of acceptance like a rejection of goods insofar as neither option creates an obligation to
pay the contract price for the goods.402 If the all events tests account for the rights and liabilities fixed by an initial acceptance,
then the tests can easily account for the revocation as a condition subsequent that extinguishes those rights and liabilities regardless of the year during which the revocation occurs.403 The
all events tests could therefore use a simple approach of treating
rights and liabilities as fixed by unrevoked acceptance even if a
dispute exists about alleged nonconforming performance.404
See U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017). The substantial impairment requirement for revocation places a higher burden on a
buyer, who seeks to revisit a completed transaction, for goods that the buyer
could have initially rejected with relative ease. See Priest, supra note 356, at
972 (describing the higher burden as being sensitive to loss shifting where,
due to the passage of time since acceptance, a buyer might otherwise attempt
a revocation to benefit from changing market prices or to correct its selection
of goods that later seem unsuitable).
401 See U.C.C. § 2-608(1) (AM. L. INST. & UNIF. L. COMM’N 2017).
402 See id. § 2-608(3).
403 How contracting parties might account for the performance that preceded
a disputed or undisputed revocation of acceptance under current performancefocused applications of the all events tests remains unclear. See supra note
368 and accompanying text.
404 See id.
400
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C. An Illustration of Implied Acceptance as a Condition
Gillis v. United States405 supplies a context for illustrating
the role that implied acceptance could fill as a condition precedent to the all events tests.406 Although the case does not involve
regulatory provisions governing process-related aspects of a business, Gillis applied the all events test to a supplier’s liability in
the cotton industry, where trading happens under significant
private regulation.407 The case helps highlight issues with nonconforming performance, knowledge, and disputes in a selfgoverning industry, and it provides a scenario for illustrating
how acceptance could function as a condition precedent in determining fixed rights and liabilities.408
Within a single taxable year, the partnership in Gillis
sold and shipped bales of cotton to a foreign buyer as well as received full payment of the contract prices from the buyer.409 The
contracts provided that the buyer could later make claims for
breach if the buyer received cotton that varied from the specifications stated in the contracts.410 The contracts further provided
that the parties would settle any dispute over such claims
through an arbitration procedure established for international
cotton trade.411
The partnership in Gillis had knowingly shipped cotton
grown in a region that experienced heavy rainfall, which meant
the partnership knew—at the time of shipment—that it was using cotton of an inferior grade than promised in the contract and
that the buyer would make claims against the partnership.412
The buyer eventually made twelve claims against the partnership,
and the partnership paid four claims immediately and refused
402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 508–09.
407 See Cotton Industry, supra note 157, 1726–45 (describing procedural rules,
substantive rules, and adjudication in the cotton industry); id. at 1724 (“The
cotton industry has almost entirely opted out of the public legal system, replacing
it with one of the oldest and most complex systems of private commercial law.”).
408 See generally, Gillis, 402 F.2d at 501.
409 Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
410 Id.
411 Id.
412 Id.
405
406

2021]

THE ALL EVENTS TESTS

393

the others.413 After pursuing certain appeals, the partnership paid
the amounts awarded at the conclusion of the designated arbitration procedures for the remaining eight claims414—notwithstanding
that payment occurred after three more years of resistance and
under a threat of judicial intervention.415
For the year of shipment, the accrual-method partnership
in Gillis included the payments it received in gross income and
concurrently took a deduction equal to the amount that the partnership calculated it would owe for all of the buyer’s anticipated
claims.416 The Service sought to disallow the deduction by portraying the claims as contingent liabilities that, consistent with
ample case law, could not become fixed prior to a final resolution
of the disputes.417 But the Gillis court found judicial contests of
liability—such as the litigated claims regarded as contingent liabilities in the case law cited by the Service—“materially distinguishable” from the arbitration procedures applicable to the
buyer’s claims in Gillis.418 The court described arbitration in the
cotton industry as less adversative than traditional litigation and
noted how such claims, which were routine under industry norms,
“sting” less than disputes heard in judicial trials.419 Those differences led the court to remark: “We do not see anticipated
claims regularly disposed of by arbitration as the handmaiden of
contingency.”420 As a result, the court refused to “penalize the
partnership for using the arbitration procedure” and treated the
claims submitted to arbitration as having been unconditionally
fixed for tax purposes when the partnership shipped the inferior
grade cotton.421
Id.
Id.
415 Gillis v. United States, 267 F. Supp. 547, 553 (S.D. Tex. 1966), aff’d in
part and rev’d in part, 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968).
416 Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508 (describing the partnership’s damage calculation
as “the difference in the price paid [by the buyer] and the price of the cotton
actually shipped”).
417 Id. at 509; see also 1968 A.O.D. Lexis 293 (Dec. 27, 1968) (finding that,
when the partnership shipped the inferior cotton, “there existed only possible
liabilities” for the buyer’s claims).
418 Gillis, 402 F.2d at 509.
419 Id.
420 Id.
421 Id. at 510.
413
414
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Gillis departs from a traditional application of the all events
tests in two notable respects.422 First, the case attaches significance
to knowledge about nonconforming performance even though the
case fails to explore the full import of such knowledge.423 Other
courts have denied deductions for anticipated claims arising from
nonconforming performance where taxpayers lacked knowledge
about their defective performances by year-end,424 even where
such defects were presumably knowable.425 In contrast, the Gillis
Court emphasized that the partnership knew its shipment of inferior goods established its liability despite its later refusal to
pay some asserted claims.426 In light of the private legal system that
has largely governed the cotton trade since the mid-1800s,427 one
might infer that the partnership in Gillis knew of its fixed liability
and merely contested the amount of liability. The partnership’s
contracts followed industry norms428 by allowing the buyer’s
See Recent Case, Income Tax—When Items Become Deductible—Damage
Claims Which Were Reasonably Estimated and Which Were Predictable with High
Accuracy Could Be Accrued and Deducted Before Final Settlement—Gillis v.
United States, 402 F.2d 501 (5th Cir. 1968), 83 HARV. L. REV. 1452, 1453
(1970) [hereinafter Recent Case].
423 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508–10 (expressing repeatedly that the partnership knew the goods were nonconforming).
424 See, e.g., Challenge Publ’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 342, 349
(1986) (finding reliance on Gillis misplaced because being “virtually certain ...
still falls short of the absolute certainty required in order for a liability to be
fixed”), aff’d, 845 F.2d 1541 (9th Cir. 1988); W.J. Strickland Co. v. Comm’r, 33
T.C.M. (CCH) 484, 487 (1974) (finding Gillis distinguishable from a situation
where the CEO was “shocked” to learn about the company’s manufacturing
defect); Gateway Transp. Co. v. United States, 39 A.F.T.R.2d 77-647, 77-654
(W.D. Wis. 1976) (“By contrast [to the situation in Gillis], there is no suggestion here that plaintiff knew ....”); 1994 F.S.A. LEXIS 283 (Mar. 23, 1994) (distinguishing Gillis from a situation where products were not sold with known defects).
425 See W.J. Strickland, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) at 487 (manufacturing defect
discovered on last day of tax year during product installation); Gateway
Transp., 39 A.F.T.R.2d 77-647, 77-655 (“[I]t cannot be said that plaintiff’s liability was determinable by the plaintiff at the very times at which the critical
events occurred.”).
426 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 509.
427 See Cotton Industry, supra note 157, at 1724–25.
428 See id. at 1733 (contrasting the market-difference measurement of
damages available to an aggrieved party in the cotton trade, which adjusts a
contract price to market price, with the measurement of damages under the
UCC, which protect expectancy interests).
422

2021]

THE ALL EVENTS TESTS

395

claims to adjust the agreed upon contract prices to the prevailing market prices for the quality of cotton actually delivered.429
When the partnership knowingly shipped inferior cotton, it was
understood that the buyer became entitled to make claims.430
However, the industry has traditionally graded cotton through a
subjective process.431 So the partnership would have been uncertain
about the applicable market prices because the parties could have
assigned different grades to the delivered cotton.432 Accordingly,
references in Gillis to determining an appropriate price for the
cotton through arbitration proceedings indicate that the court
accepted the partnership’s unconditional liability for the claims
and attributed the parties’ dispute to the claim amounts.433
Knowledge helped identify the fixed liability because the
partnership’s contracts—following industry norms—established
an adjustment procedure for nonconforming performance.434 The
parties had agreed on consequences for a delivery of inferior cotton,
and the partnership’s nonconforming performance was the event
that fixed its liability under their agreement.435 The partnership
presumably should have accounted for its liability arising from
its known nonconforming performance just like it would account
for rights and liabilities fixed by other known events.436
See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
Id.
431 See Cotton Industry, supra note 157, at 1745.
432 See id. at 1773–74.
433 See also id. at 1773 (describing how the cotton “industry has created a
separate ... [arbitration board] to deal with the most common type of factbased misunderstanding, namely disagreements over whether a delivery conforms to the contract’s quality specifications”).
434 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508–09.
435 Note that the liability became fixed in Gillis in the year before the buyer
made its claims. See id. A claim submission can function as a condition precedent that can delay an accrual, particularly where the likelihood of a claim
is uncertain, such as consumer claims under product warranties. See Chrysler
Corp. v. Comm’r., 436 F.3d 644, 650–51 (6th Cir. 2006). Alternatively, a claim
submission can represent a ministerial act that will not delay an accrual,
such as in circumstances like Gillis where business interests motivate claim
submissions. See Rev. Rul. 98-39, 1998-2 C.B. 198, 199 (distinguishing claim
submissions made to receive payment for cooperative advertising services).
436 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 506–07 (citing several cases where parties
preemptively accounted for known future liabilities).
429
430
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Curiously, the actual knowledge of nonconforming performance did not prevent or alter the accrual of income in Gillis.437
If the partnership knowingly failed to perform as promised, then
how could the partnership have a fixed right to income from the
deficient acts? Alternatively, if the partnership had a fixed right
to income and the parties only needed to adjust the contract prices
for the shipment of inferior cotton, then how could the partnership
determine the amount of its income with reasonable accuracy
without accounting for the buyer’s anticipated claims? A taxpayer
should not knowingly fail to perform as promised and yet accrue
income as if it had.
Perhaps the Gillis court never questioned income recognition because the partnership received all of the payments in full
and reported them as income even though they were not properly
earned.438 Elsewhere in its opinion, the court recited the mantra
that taxpayers must recognize income upon receipt.439 The Service likewise points to receipt as an event that fixes a taxpayer’s
right to income.440 However, receipt seems ill suited to require
income recognition attributable to a full performance where the
taxpayer has knowingly failed to perform.441 In particular, any
See id. at 508–10.
See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
439 Id. at 506.
440 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
441 One might question whether the partnership had to report the amounts
received as income under the claim of right doctrine. That doctrine requires a
taxpayer to report income received under a claim of right and without restriction on its use or disposition even though the taxpayer might face a contingent repayment obligation. See N. Am. Oil Consol. v. Burnet, 286 U.S. 417,
424 (1932). However, the doctrine does not apply to receipts that a taxpayer
has an acknowledged, unconditional obligation to repay. See Ahadpour v.
Comm’r, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) 1210, 1214 (1999) (refusing to apply the claim of
right doctrine where the taxpayer had “an existing and fixed obligation ... to
repay the deposits” under a contract for the sale of property). Because the
Gillis court found that the partnership knew of its unconditional liability for
the buyer’s claims when it shipped the inferior cotton, the claim of right doctrine seems inapplicable to the claim amounts. Compare Gillis, 402 F.2d at
508 (finding that the partnership had a fixed liability to the buyer because
the partnership knew its obligations under the contract and knew it shipped
nonconforming cotton), with Ahadpour, 77 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1214 (refusing to
apply the claim of right doctrine when a taxpayer knew it had an future obligation to repay received deposits).
437
438
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inference that the partnership had a fixed right to the entire
contract price promised for full performance—under the formulaic due-paid-or-earned approach to the all events test—does not
accord with the court’s finding that the partnership contemporaneously knew of its unconditional obligation to repay part of
those amounts due to its failure to perform.442
In this situation, the satisfaction of an implied condition
of acceptance would establish a sound basis for concluding that
the partnership had a fixed right to receive the contract prices.443
As discussed above, an acceptance of tendered goods commits a
purchaser to pay the agreed upon purchase price regardless of
whether the goods conform to their promised specifications.444
Accordingly, once the buyer explicitly or implicitly accepted the
inferior cotton, the partnership secured a fixed right to the contract prices despite its knowledge of its nonconforming shipments.445 The partnership could later account for any of the buyer’s
claims, whether fixed or contingent at shipment, as adjustments
to the amount recognized as a result of the buyer’s acceptance.446
The other notable feature of Gillis was the influence that
industry norms for handling nonconforming performance had on
the court’s application of the all events test.447 The court justifiably took into account how private regulation, through international arbitration, operates in the cotton industry.448 In addition
to relying on arbitration for general disputes, trade associations
in the industry have created a separate tribunal that makes
binding determinations about whether delivered cotton meets the
specifications in a contract.449 The tribunal provides a neutral
basis for grading cotton, which is otherwise subjectively graded
See Rev. Rul. 74-607, 1974-2 C.B. 149, 149–50 (requiring inclusion when
performance fixes the right to receive income, unless payment is made or becomes due earlier).
443 See supra text accompanying notes 361–65.
444 Id.
445 See id.
446 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
447 See id. at 508, 510.
448 See id. at 509 (aspects of arbitration in international cotton industry);
Recent Case, supra note 422, at 1454 (stating that the Gillis approach does
not force a party to choose between arbitration and litigation and therefore
does not penalize a party for utilizing arbitration).
449 See Cotton Industry, supra note 157, at 1727.
442
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by contracting parties and which is susceptible to damage (i.e.,
the cotton changes) after shipment and before delivery.450 The
tribunal provides such an efficient mechanism for dealing with
routine questions about whether a delivery conforms to specifications that its use has become a normal business practice that
does not damage trading relationships,451 which presumably led
the Gillis court to describe it as less adversative than traditional
litigation.452 The Gillis court accordingly found that the routine
mechanism for implementing and the mutual expectation of having the market price paid for a delivery of inferior cotton fixed the
partnership’s liability for the claims at shipment without treating the liability as contingent on receiving a final adjustment
through the arbitration proceedings.453
The routine use of nonjudicial mechanisms, including arbitration, to address nonconforming performance is not unique
to the cotton industry.454 Through self-regulation, contracting
parties often seek to encourage conforming performances and
address nonconforming aspects without relying on courts, without
terminating agreements, and without imposing financial penalties.455 These parties not only anticipate nonconforming performance but they develop mechanisms to address it.456 Gillis pointed
to aspects of finality in the cotton industry’s arbitration procedures,
See id. at 1773–74.
See id. at 1774 (“In general, transactors do not view asking for quality
arbitration as damaging to their commercial relationship as long as it is not
done too often.”).
452 Where parties cannot tell whether an instance of nonconforming performance or a claim of nonconformity results from unintentional causes or
opportunistic motives, the tribunal prevents a breakdown of trade by providing a neutral determination of quality along with a nonpunitive adjustment
to the appropriate market price. See id. at 1773–74. Without such measures,
an instance of nonconforming performance or a claim of nonconformity, which
would arise in an environment where the risk of inadvertent breach is high,
would likely result in a termination of their relationship. See id. at 1775–77
(“[C]ooperation is more likely to be maintained if transactors do not respond
to every bad outcome by inflicting a punishment.”).
453 See Gillis v. United States, 402 F.2d 501, 509–10 (5th Cir. 1968).
454 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 991–92 (analyzing twelve different businesses that rely more on trade-norms and informal processes to resolve
dispute than litigation); Lin, supra note 20, at 714 (stating that international
companies increasingly favor arbitration as a tool to resolve disputes).
455 See Hadfield & Bozovic, supra note 23, at 991–92.
456 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
450
451
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which provided no judicial recourse, to “justify a tax treatment
different from more porous and less final procedures of determining
liability.”457 Other industries and taxpayers employ comparable
self-contained mechanisms for addressing nonconforming performances, and these mechanisms deserve similar considerations in
applying the all events tests.458 Gillis appropriately emphasizes
the need to take private regulation into account in determining
fixed rights and liabilities; however, thoughtful consideration of
applicable self-regulation efforts threatens to impose an administratively burdensome inquiry into the norms and practices of
each industry or taxpayer as well as its mechanisms for resolving disputes.459
The recognition of implied acceptance requirements under
the all events tests provides an opportunity to avoid the administrative burden of assessing the impact on rights and liabilities
of industry- —and taxpayer- — specific mechanisms for addressing nonconforming performance.460 Insofar as those mechanisms
contemplate that parties will make price adjustments, follow corrective steps, or take other actions without rejecting nonconforming
performance, the mechanisms exhibit tolerances—whether by
industry custom or mutual agreement—for certain deviations
from required performances.461 The mechanisms effectively provide
the means for dealing with nonconforming aspects of otherwise
accepted performances.462 Although unraveling self-regulating
mechanisms to determine their potential effect on rights and
liabilities presents a burdensome task, the all events tests could
alternatively simply acknowledge that these mechanisms apply
to accepted performance and that the acceptance of conforming
or nonconforming performance establishes an unconditional obligation to pay the contract price. The use of arbitration, as in
Gillis, or other mechanisms to address possible nonconforming
aspects of performance would not make the obligation to pay the
Id. at 509.
See Enforceable Arbitration of Commercial Disputes in the Textile Industries, 61 YALE L.J. 686, 687 (1952) (presenting information on rayon, silk,
and wool industries and their reliance on arbitration over litigation).
459 Recent Case, supra note 422, at 1454.
460 See id. (expressing potential for high administrative burden under Gillis
rule).
461 See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
462 Id.
457
458
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contract price contingent.463 Instead, the mechanism might lead
to an adjustment to the amount accrued for a right or liability
otherwise fixed by acceptance.464 In short, self-regulating mechanisms do not have to complicate applications of the all events
tests because the mechanisms apply to accepted performance,
and acceptance provides a rational basis for identifying fixed
rights and liabilities for purposes of the all events tests.
CONCLUSION
The increasing use of self-regulation by buyers and sellers
presents a challenge for the all events tests.465 Self-regulation of
process-related aspects of operations can enhance performance
obligations, introduce credence qualities, and alter business relationships in ways that make the application of the all events tests
uncertain.466 The potential for conforming and nonconforming performance under a regulatory provision in a contract, for example,
complicates efforts to identify a condition on payment obligations, the satisfaction of performance obligations, the certainty of
rights and liabilities, and the knowable information about relevant events.467 However, if the all events tests were to recognize
an implied acceptance requirement as a condition on rights and
liabilities for a sale of goods or services, then much of the uncertainty in self-regulated relationships and other situations would
disappear.468 This approach would acknowledge that a buyer’s acceptance, rather than the seller’s performance, establishes payment
obligations. Therefore, acceptance could act as an identifiable
event that fixes rights and liabilities for both conforming and
nonconforming performances under the all events tests.

See supra notes 361–65 and accompanying text.
See Gillis, 402 F.2d at 508.
465 See supra text accompanying notes 1–4.
466 See supra notes 11–16 and accompanying text.
467 See supra Part I.
468 See supra Part II.
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